claims_steal · Ruflo MCP: Risk & Policy

WHAT IT DOES

What claims_steal does on Ruflo

AI agents invoke claims_steal to trigger actions in Ruflo. What it does depends on the arguments the agent supplies, and its effects often reach beyond the immediate call — builds kicked off, notifications sent, workflows started.

WHY IT NEEDS A POLICY

Why claims_steal needs a policy

This tool appears to bypass or take control of access claims/capabilities from one agent context to another. While framed as a capability management tool, 'steal' semantics combined with privilege escalation for 'privileged ops' makes this an Execute-level risk—it enables agents to perform actions outside their normal authorization scope, potentially accessing file systems or resources they shouldn't.

From the tool's definition Tool named 'claims_steal' with description mentioning 'Steal a stealable issue' and capability gating for privileged operations. The context of 'claims_grant + claims_check' indicates this tool forcibly acquires/escalates permissions.

Risk signalsAdmin/system-level operation

Attacks that exploit this kind of access

Recommended rule Ready

Verdict

claims_steal Rate-limited

claims_steal stays usable, but rate-capped — a runaway agent can't fire it dozens of times a minute. Everything else on the server is denied unless you say otherwise.

View as policy code

policy.json

{
  "version": "1",
  "default": "deny",
  "tools": {
    "claims_steal": {
      "limits": [
        {
          "counter": "claims_steal_rate",
          "window": "minute",
          "max": 10,
          "scope": "grant"
        }
      ]
    }
  }
}

RATE-LIMIT THIS TOOL →

Instant setup, no code required.

PolicyLayer is an MCP gateway: every tool call is checked against your rule before it reaches Ruflo, so you can run agents against it safely.

FAQ

Questions about claims_steal

What does the claims_steal tool do? +

Steal a stealable issue Use when nothing native covers per-agent capability gating — Claude Code agents have file-system access by default. Pair claims_grant + claims_check before letting an agent run privileged ops. For trusted in-session work, no claims call is needed. It is categorised as a Execute tool in the Ruflo MCP Server, which means it can trigger actions or run processes. Use rate limits and argument validation.

How do I enforce a policy on claims_steal? +

Register the Ruflo MCP server in PolicyLayer and add a rule for claims_steal: allow, deny, rate-limit, or require approval. Point your MCP client at the PolicyLayer proxy URL and the rule is enforced on every call, before it reaches Ruflo. Nothing to install.

What risk level is claims_steal? +

claims_steal is a Execute tool with high risk. Execute tools should be rate-limited and have argument validation enabled.

Can I rate-limit claims_steal? +

Yes. Add a rate_limit block to the claims_steal rule in your PolicyLayer policy. For example, setting max: 10 and window: 60 limits the tool to 10 calls per minute. Rate limits are tracked per agent session and reset automatically.

How do I block claims_steal completely? +

Set action: deny in the PolicyLayer policy for claims_steal. The AI agent will receive a policy violation error and cannot call the tool. You can also include a reason field to explain why the tool is blocked.

What MCP server provides claims_steal? +

claims_steal is provided by the Ruflo MCP server (ruvnet/ruflo). PolicyLayer sits as a proxy in front of this server to enforce policies before tool calls reach the server.