AI agents use hooks_transfer to commit financial operations through Ruflo — usually the final step of a payment, billing, or trading workflow. A call moves real money.
hooks_transfer moves real money, and an autonomous agent will call it with the same confidence it calls a search tool. A misread instruction or an injected prompt is all it takes to drain an account or blow a budget.
Attacks that exploit this kind of access
Transfer learned patterns from another project Use when native Bash hooks (via Claude Code\. It is categorised as a Financial tool in the Ruflo MCP Server, which means it involves financial transactions. Block by default and require explicit approval.
Register the Ruflo MCP server in PolicyLayer and add a rule for hooks_transfer: allow, deny, rate-limit, or require approval. Point your MCP client at the PolicyLayer proxy URL and the rule is enforced on every call, before it reaches Ruflo. Nothing to install.
hooks_transfer is a Financial tool with critical risk. Critical-risk tools should be blocked by default and only enabled with explicit human approval.
Yes. Add a rate_limit block to the hooks_transfer rule in your PolicyLayer policy. For example, setting max: 10 and window: 60 limits the tool to 10 calls per minute. Rate limits are tracked per agent session and reset automatically.
Set action: deny in the PolicyLayer policy for hooks_transfer. The AI agent will receive a policy violation error and cannot call the tool. You can also include a reason field to explain why the tool is blocked.
hooks_transfer is provided by the Ruflo MCP server (ruvnet/ruflo). PolicyLayer sits as a proxy in front of this server to enforce policies before tool calls reach the server.
hooks_transfer is one line of Ruflo's registry record.
The record carries the whole server: verified identity, auth posture, risk grade, every tool classified, recommended policy — re-checked continuously.
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