Return everything ABOUT a file without pulling its content (no token cost from the body). Tags, size, est_tokens, history depth, related-file ids, backlinks, project, folder, last edited. Operates locally with no auth or rate limits. Use this when you
AI agents call describe_file to retrieve information from Kontexta without modifying anything — typically the context-gathering step in research, monitoring, and reporting workflows, before the agent takes action elsewhere.
This is a straightforward metadata retrieval operation with no side effects. It queries file properties and relationships but does not modify, execute, delete, or create anything. The local-first architecture and explicit exclusion of content retrieval further confirm it is a safe Read operation with minimal blast radius if misused.
From the tool's definition Tool returns metadata ABOUT a file: tags, size, est_tokens, history depth, related-file ids, backlinks, project, folder, last edited. Explicitly states 'without pulling its content' and 'no token cost from the body'.
Risk signalsBulk/mass operation — affects multiple targets
Attacks that exploit this kind of access
Return everything ABOUT a file without pulling its content (no token cost from the body). Tags, size, est_tokens, history depth, related-file ids, backlinks, project, folder, last edited. Operates locally with no auth or rate limits. Use this when you. It is categorised as a Read tool in the Kontexta MCP Server, which means it retrieves data without modifying state.
Register the Kontexta MCP server in PolicyLayer and add a rule for describe_file: allow, deny, rate-limit, or require approval. Point your MCP client at the PolicyLayer proxy URL and the rule is enforced on every call, before it reaches Kontexta. Nothing to install.
describe_file is a Read tool with low risk. Read-only tools are generally safe to allow by default.
Yes. Add a rate_limit block to the describe_file rule in your PolicyLayer policy. For example, setting max: 10 and window: 60 limits the tool to 10 calls per minute. Rate limits are tracked per agent session and reset automatically.
Set action: deny in the PolicyLayer policy for describe_file. The AI agent will receive a policy violation error and cannot call the tool. You can also include a reason field to explain why the tool is blocked.
describe_file is provided by the Kontexta MCP server (safiyu/kontexta). PolicyLayer sits as a proxy in front of this server to enforce policies before tool calls reach the server.
Every MCP server has a record like this.
Type a name, get the same breakdown: verified identity, auth posture, risk grade, capabilities, recommended policy.
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