AI agents call clawd_bastion as a supporting operation in Clawd workflows.
The description is empty, making it impossible to determine what this tool does. The name 'bastion' could refer to a security gateway/jump host concept, which might relate to the server's 'secure, virtualized' environment. Given the server context involves security, agents, and communication gateways, a bastion could be a security control point.
From the tool's definition Tool name 'clawd_bastion' with empty description. No functional information provided.
Attacks that exploit this kind of access
clawd_bastion. It is categorised as a Other tool in the Clawd MCP Server, which means it performs auxiliary operations.
Register the Clawd MCP server in PolicyLayer and add a rule for clawd_bastion: allow, deny, rate-limit, or require approval. Point your MCP client at the PolicyLayer proxy URL and the rule is enforced on every call, before it reaches Clawd. Nothing to install.
clawd_bastion is a Other tool with low risk. Read-only tools are generally safe to allow by default.
Yes. Add a rate_limit block to the clawd_bastion rule in your PolicyLayer policy. For example, setting max: 10 and window: 60 limits the tool to 10 calls per minute. Rate limits are tracked per agent session and reset automatically.
Set action: deny in the PolicyLayer policy for clawd_bastion. The AI agent will receive a policy violation error and cannot call the tool. You can also include a reason field to explain why the tool is blocked.
clawd_bastion is provided by the Clawd MCP server (sandraschi/openclaw-molt-mcp). PolicyLayer sits as a proxy in front of this server to enforce policies before tool calls reach the server.
Every MCP server has a record like this.
Type a name, get the same breakdown: verified identity, auth posture, risk grade, capabilities, recommended policy.
Teams ship this data inside their own products. See what a licence covers →