AI agents call clawd_voice as a supporting operation in Clawd workflows.
The description is empty, providing no information about what this tool does. The name 'clawd_voice' suggests it may relate to voice communication features within the broader ecosystem (WhatsApp, Discord integrations), but this could span Read, Write, or Execute categories.
From the tool's definition Tool name 'clawd_voice' with empty description. No functional details available.
Attacks that exploit this kind of access
clawd_voice. It is categorised as a Other tool in the Clawd MCP Server, which means it performs auxiliary operations.
Register the Clawd MCP server in PolicyLayer and add a rule for clawd_voice: allow, deny, rate-limit, or require approval. Point your MCP client at the PolicyLayer proxy URL and the rule is enforced on every call, before it reaches Clawd. Nothing to install.
clawd_voice is a Other tool with low risk. Read-only tools are generally safe to allow by default.
Yes. Add a rate_limit block to the clawd_voice rule in your PolicyLayer policy. For example, setting max: 10 and window: 60 limits the tool to 10 calls per minute. Rate limits are tracked per agent session and reset automatically.
Set action: deny in the PolicyLayer policy for clawd_voice. The AI agent will receive a policy violation error and cannot call the tool. You can also include a reason field to explain why the tool is blocked.
clawd_voice is provided by the Clawd MCP server (sandraschi/openclaw-molt-mcp). PolicyLayer sits as a proxy in front of this server to enforce policies before tool calls reach the server.
Every MCP server has a record like this.
Type a name, get the same breakdown: verified identity, auth posture, risk grade, capabilities, recommended policy.
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