AI agents call arr_stack as a supporting operation in PlexMCP workflows.
The description is empty and the name 'arr_stack' is ambiguous. It could refer to integration with *arr applications (Sonarr, Radarr, etc.) for media management, but without any description, the exact action cannot be determined. Lowering confidence significantly due to lack of information.
From the tool's definition Tool name 'arr_stack' and empty description provide no clear indication of what the tool does.
Attacks that exploit this kind of access
arr_stack. It is categorised as a Other tool in the PlexMCP MCP Server, which means it performs auxiliary operations.
Register the Plex MCP server in PolicyLayer and add a rule for arr_stack: allow, deny, rate-limit, or require approval. Point your MCP client at the PolicyLayer proxy URL and the rule is enforced on every call, before it reaches PlexMCP. Nothing to install.
arr_stack is a Other tool with low risk. Read-only tools are generally safe to allow by default.
Yes. Add a rate_limit block to the arr_stack rule in your PolicyLayer policy. For example, setting max: 10 and window: 60 limits the tool to 10 calls per minute. Rate limits are tracked per agent session and reset automatically.
Set action: deny in the PolicyLayer policy for arr_stack. The AI agent will receive a policy violation error and cannot call the tool. You can also include a reason field to explain why the tool is blocked.
arr_stack is provided by the Plex MCP server (sandraschi/plexmcp). PolicyLayer sits as a proxy in front of this server to enforce policies before tool calls reach the server.
Every MCP server has a record like this.
Type a name, get the same breakdown: verified identity, auth posture, risk grade, capabilities, recommended policy.
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