dispatch_agent
AI agents invoke dispatch_agent to trigger actions in MCP Claude Code. What it does depends on the arguments the agent supplies, and its effects often reach beyond the immediate call — builds kicked off, notifications sent, workflows started.
The server-level description explicitly mentions executing commands and modifying files. 'dispatch_agent' suggests spawning or delegating work to a sub-agent, which on such a server likely involves executing operations (code analysis, file modification, command execution). With sibling tools like edit, multi_edit, content_replace, and no description to narrow scope, the most plausible interpretation is Execute.
From the tool's definition Tool name 'dispatch_agent' on a server that 'execute commands' and 'manage projects through direct file system interactions'; tool description is empty.
Attacks that exploit this kind of access
dispatch_agent. It is categorised as a Execute tool in the MCP Claude Code MCP Server, which means it can trigger actions or run processes. Use rate limits and argument validation.
Register the MCP Claude Code MCP server in PolicyLayer and add a rule for dispatch_agent: allow, deny, rate-limit, or require approval. Point your MCP client at the PolicyLayer proxy URL and the rule is enforced on every call, before it reaches MCP Claude Code. Nothing to install.
dispatch_agent is a Execute tool with high risk. Execute tools should be rate-limited and have argument validation enabled.
Yes. Add a rate_limit block to the dispatch_agent rule in your PolicyLayer policy. For example, setting max: 10 and window: 60 limits the tool to 10 calls per minute. Rate limits are tracked per agent session and reset automatically.
Set action: deny in the PolicyLayer policy for dispatch_agent. The AI agent will receive a policy violation error and cannot call the tool. You can also include a reason field to explain why the tool is blocked.
dispatch_agent is provided by the MCP Claude Code MCP server (sdglbl/mcp-claude-code). PolicyLayer sits as a proxy in front of this server to enforce policies before tool calls reach the server.
Every MCP server has a record like this.
Type a name, get the same breakdown: verified identity, auth posture, risk grade, capabilities, recommended policy.
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