AI agents call delete_secret to permanently remove resources in DMCP — typically in cleanup and lifecycle workflows. It does its job in a single call, and there is no undo.
The tool removes data without possibility of recovery. Although the context is a text-based RPG (low real-world impact), the irreversible deletion of game state (secrets) classifies it as Destructive rather than Write. Severity is high because an agent misusing this could destroy narrative elements that cannot be restored without manual intervention or backups.
From the tool's definition Tool description states 'Delete a secret permanently. This is IRREVERSIBLE.' The use of 'permanently' and explicit capitalization of 'IRREVERSIBLE' indicates an operation that cannot be undone.
Documented attack patterns abuse exactly the kind of access delete_secret gives an agent:
PolicyLayer is an MCP gateway — it sits between your AI agents and DMCP, and nothing reaches the server without passing your rules. This is the rule we recommend for delete_secret:
{
"version": "1",
"default": "deny",
"hide": [
"delete_secret"
]
}delete_secret disappears from the agent's tool list entirely, and any attempt to call it is denied. The rest of the server keeps working.
Free to start. No card required.
Delete a secret permanently. This is IRREVERSIBLE. It is categorised as a Destructive tool in the DMCP MCP Server, which means it can permanently delete or destroy data. Block by default and require explicit approval.
Register the D MCP server in PolicyLayer and add a rule for delete_secret: allow, deny, rate-limit, or require approval. Point your MCP client at the PolicyLayer proxy URL and the rule is enforced on every call, before it reaches DMCP. Nothing to install.
delete_secret is a Destructive tool with critical risk. Critical-risk tools should be blocked by default and only enabled with explicit human approval.
Yes. Add a rate_limit block to the delete_secret rule in your PolicyLayer policy. For example, setting max: 10 and window: 60 limits the tool to 10 calls per minute. Rate limits are tracked per agent session and reset automatically.
Set action: deny in the PolicyLayer policy for delete_secret. The AI agent will receive a policy violation error and cannot call the tool. You can also include a reason field to explain why the tool is blocked.
delete_secret is provided by the D MCP server (shawnrushefsky/dmcp). PolicyLayer sits as a proxy in front of this server to enforce policies before tool calls reach the server.
Start from DMCP, add the rest of your stack, and see everything your agents can call. Then put policy on all of it.
Free to start. No card required.
204 DMCP tools catalogued and risk-classified — across an index of 43,000+ MCP servers.