AI agents invoke paste_text_input to trigger actions in Macinput. What it does depends on the arguments the agent supplies, and its effects often reach beyond the immediate call — builds kicked off, notifications sent, workflows started.
This tool executes a desktop GUI action by placing text into the clipboard and simulating a paste keyboard shortcut, which can inject arbitrary content into any focused application. Misuse could lead to code injection, data manipulation, or unintended writes across any open application, making it an Execute-category tool with high severity due to its broad blast radius across the desktop environment.
From the tool's definition 'Paste plain text into the focused target via clipboard and Cmd+V' — triggers a keyboard action (Cmd+V) and manipulates the clipboard to inject text into the focused UI element
Attacks that exploit this kind of access
Paste plain text into the focused target via clipboard and Cmd+V. It is categorised as a Execute tool in the Macinput MCP Server, which means it can trigger actions or run processes. Use rate limits and argument validation.
Register the Macinput MCP server in PolicyLayer and add a rule for paste_text_input: allow, deny, rate-limit, or require approval. Point your MCP client at the PolicyLayer proxy URL and the rule is enforced on every call, before it reaches Macinput. Nothing to install.
paste_text_input is a Execute tool with high risk. Execute tools should be rate-limited and have argument validation enabled.
Yes. Add a rate_limit block to the paste_text_input rule in your PolicyLayer policy. For example, setting max: 10 and window: 60 limits the tool to 10 calls per minute. Rate limits are tracked per agent session and reset automatically.
Set action: deny in the PolicyLayer policy for paste_text_input. The AI agent will receive a policy violation error and cannot call the tool. You can also include a reason field to explain why the tool is blocked.
paste_text_input is provided by the Macinput MCP server (sigma711/macinput). PolicyLayer sits as a proxy in front of this server to enforce policies before tool calls reach the server.
Every MCP server has a record like this.
Type a name, get the same breakdown: verified identity, auth posture, risk grade, capabilities, recommended policy.
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