Drag an element and drop it onto another element.
AI agents use browser_drag_drop to create or update resources in BrowserMCP — usually the action step of a workflow, after the agent has gathered context. Every call changes real data in your BrowserMCP environment.
An AI agent can call browser_drag_drop faster than any human can review — one bad instruction and it creates or modifies resources in BrowserMCP by the hundred, each call as confident as the last.
Attacks that exploit this kind of access
Drag an element and drop it onto another element. It is categorised as a Write tool in the BrowserMCP MCP Server, which means it can create or modify data. Consider rate limits to prevent runaway writes.
Register the Browser MCP server in PolicyLayer and add a rule for browser_drag_drop: allow, deny, rate-limit, or require approval. Point your MCP client at the PolicyLayer proxy URL and the rule is enforced on every call, before it reaches BrowserMCP. Nothing to install.
browser_drag_drop is a Write tool with medium risk. Write tools should be rate-limited to prevent accidental bulk modifications.
Yes. Add a rate_limit block to the browser_drag_drop rule in your PolicyLayer policy. For example, setting max: 10 and window: 60 limits the tool to 10 calls per minute. Rate limits are tracked per agent session and reset automatically.
Set action: deny in the PolicyLayer policy for browser_drag_drop. The AI agent will receive a policy violation error and cannot call the tool. You can also include a reason field to explain why the tool is blocked.
browser_drag_drop is provided by the Browser MCP server (smotree/browsermcp). PolicyLayer sits as a proxy in front of this server to enforce policies before tool calls reach the server.