Run a shell command in the project directory
AI agents invoke run_command to trigger actions in MCP-Claude Code Bridge. What it does depends on the arguments the agent supplies, and its effects often reach beyond the immediate call — builds kicked off, notifications sent, workflows started.
Shell command execution is inherently an Execute-category risk because the outcome depends entirely on the argument (the command string). While not strictly destructive or financial by itself, it can trivially become either if the AI agent crafts malicious or unintended commands (e.g., `rm -rf /`, financial exfiltration scripts). The blast radius is maximal because shell access permits all forms of system compromise.
From the tool's definition Tool explicitly described as 'Run a shell command in the project directory' — this directly executes arbitrary code with the capability to modify, delete, or exfiltrate data depending on the command provided.
Attacks that exploit this kind of access
Run a shell command in the project directory. It is categorised as a Execute tool in the MCP-Claude Code Bridge MCP Server, which means it can trigger actions or run processes. Use rate limits and argument validation.
Register the MCP-Claude Code Bridge MCP server in PolicyLayer and add a rule for run_command: allow, deny, rate-limit, or require approval. Point your MCP client at the PolicyLayer proxy URL and the rule is enforced on every call, before it reaches MCP-Claude Code Bridge. Nothing to install.
run_command is a Execute tool with high risk. Execute tools should be rate-limited and have argument validation enabled.
Yes. Add a rate_limit block to the run_command rule in your PolicyLayer policy. For example, setting max: 10 and window: 60 limits the tool to 10 calls per minute. Rate limits are tracked per agent session and reset automatically.
Set action: deny in the PolicyLayer policy for run_command. The AI agent will receive a policy violation error and cannot call the tool. You can also include a reason field to explain why the tool is blocked.
run_command is provided by the MCP-Claude Code Bridge MCP server (sobieskicodes/claude-desktop-mcp-to-claude-agent). PolicyLayer sits as a proxy in front of this server to enforce policies before tool calls reach the server.
Every MCP server has a record like this.
Type a name, get the same breakdown: verified identity, auth posture, risk grade, capabilities, recommended policy.
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