AI agents use ms_reveal_cell to create or update resources in Ttt — usually the action step of a workflow, after the agent has gathered context. Every call changes real data in your Ttt environment.
An AI agent can call ms_reveal_cell faster than any human can review — one bad instruction and it creates or modifies resources in Ttt by the hundred, each call as confident as the last.
Attacks that exploit this kind of access
Send a Fluffling scout to a square at (row, col). If it. It is categorised as a Write tool in the Ttt MCP Server, which means it can create or modify data. Consider rate limits to prevent runaway writes.
Register the Ttt MCP server in PolicyLayer and add a rule for ms_reveal_cell: allow, deny, rate-limit, or require approval. Point your MCP client at the PolicyLayer proxy URL and the rule is enforced on every call, before it reaches Ttt. Nothing to install.
ms_reveal_cell is a Write tool with medium risk. Write tools should be rate-limited to prevent accidental bulk modifications.
Yes. Add a rate_limit block to the ms_reveal_cell rule in your PolicyLayer policy. For example, setting max: 10 and window: 60 limits the tool to 10 calls per minute. Rate limits are tracked per agent session and reset automatically.
Set action: deny in the PolicyLayer policy for ms_reveal_cell. The AI agent will receive a policy violation error and cannot call the tool. You can also include a reason field to explain why the tool is blocked.
ms_reveal_cell is provided by the Ttt MCP server (srmtech-git/mcparcade). PolicyLayer sits as a proxy in front of this server to enforce policies before tool calls reach the server.
Every MCP server has a record like this.
Type a name, get the same breakdown: verified identity, auth posture, risk grade, capabilities, recommended policy.
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