Deletes a backup vault.
AI agents call delete_backup_vault to permanently remove resources in Storage — typically in cleanup and lifecycle workflows. It does its job in a single call, and there is no undo.
This tool performs an irreversible deletion operation on backup vault infrastructure. Deletion cannot be undone, and the loss of a backup vault could result in permanent data loss if it contained critical backups. This meets the Destructive category definition.
From the tool's definition Tool name explicitly states 'delete_backup_vault' and description confirms it 'Deletes a backup vault.' The verb 'delete' indicates irreversible removal of data storage infrastructure.
Attacks that exploit this kind of access
Deletes a backup vault. It is categorised as a Destructive tool in the Storage MCP Server, which means it can permanently delete or destroy data. Block by default and require explicit approval.
Register the Storage MCP server in PolicyLayer and add a rule for delete_backup_vault: allow, deny, rate-limit, or require approval. Point your MCP client at the PolicyLayer proxy URL and the rule is enforced on every call, before it reaches Storage. Nothing to install.
delete_backup_vault is a Destructive tool with critical risk. Critical-risk tools should be blocked by default and only enabled with explicit human approval.
Yes. Add a rate_limit block to the delete_backup_vault rule in your PolicyLayer policy. For example, setting max: 10 and window: 60 limits the tool to 10 calls per minute. Rate limits are tracked per agent session and reset automatically.
Set action: deny in the PolicyLayer policy for delete_backup_vault. The AI agent will receive a policy violation error and cannot call the tool. You can also include a reason field to explain why the tool is blocked.
delete_backup_vault is provided by the Storage MCP server (@google-cloud/storage-mcp). PolicyLayer sits as a proxy in front of this server to enforce policies before tool calls reach the server.