Delete a connected account from Unipile.
AI agents call delete_account to permanently remove resources in Unipile — typically in cleanup and lifecycle workflows. It does its job in a single call, and there is no undo.
An AI agent that decides to call delete_account doesn't hesitate, doesn't double-check, and doesn't stop at one. Whatever it removes from Unipile is gone — there is no undo for destructive operations.
Attacks that exploit this kind of access
Delete a connected account from Unipile. It is categorised as a Destructive tool in the Unipile MCP Server, which means it can permanently delete or destroy data. Block by default and require explicit approval.
Register the Unipile MCP server in PolicyLayer and add a rule for delete_account: allow, deny, rate-limit, or require approval. Point your MCP client at the PolicyLayer proxy URL and the rule is enforced on every call, before it reaches Unipile. Nothing to install.
delete_account is a Destructive tool with critical risk. Critical-risk tools should be blocked by default and only enabled with explicit human approval.
Yes. Add a rate_limit block to the delete_account rule in your PolicyLayer policy. For example, setting max: 10 and window: 60 limits the tool to 10 calls per minute. Rate limits are tracked per agent session and reset automatically.
Set action: deny in the PolicyLayer policy for delete_account. The AI agent will receive a policy violation error and cannot call the tool. You can also include a reason field to explain why the tool is blocked.
delete_account is provided by the Unipile MCP server (sundeepg98/mcp-server-unipile). PolicyLayer sits as a proxy in front of this server to enforce policies before tool calls reach the server.