AI agents call raw_linkedin_request to retrieve information from Unipile without modifying anything — typically the context-gathering step in research, monitoring, and reporting workflows, before the agent takes action elsewhere.
Even though raw_linkedin_request only reads data, uncontrolled read access leaks sensitive information and racks up API costs — an agent caught in a retry loop can make thousands of calls a minute without anyone noticing.
Attacks that exploit this kind of access
Make a raw LinkedIn API request through Unipile (escape hatch). It is categorised as a Read tool in the Unipile MCP Server, which means it retrieves data without modifying state.
Register the Unipile MCP server in PolicyLayer and add a rule for raw_linkedin_request: allow, deny, rate-limit, or require approval. Point your MCP client at the PolicyLayer proxy URL and the rule is enforced on every call, before it reaches Unipile. Nothing to install.
raw_linkedin_request is a Read tool with low risk. Read-only tools are generally safe to allow by default.
Yes. Add a rate_limit block to the raw_linkedin_request rule in your PolicyLayer policy. For example, setting max: 10 and window: 60 limits the tool to 10 calls per minute. Rate limits are tracked per agent session and reset automatically.
Set action: deny in the PolicyLayer policy for raw_linkedin_request. The AI agent will receive a policy violation error and cannot call the tool. You can also include a reason field to explain why the tool is blocked.
raw_linkedin_request is provided by the Unipile MCP server (sundeepg98/mcp-server-unipile). PolicyLayer sits as a proxy in front of this server to enforce policies before tool calls reach the server.