AI agents use tap_edit_app to create or update resources in Tds — usually the action step of a workflow, after the agent has gathered context. Every call changes real data in your Tds environment.
| Parameter | Type | Required | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
appId | number | — | The app id of the game |
genre | string | — | If user provides a specific game genre, use it directly. If user is unsure or doesn't specify, analyze the code files, game mechanics, UI elem |
appName | string | — | The name of the app, if not provided, can be empty |
description | string | — | The description of the app, if not provided, can be empty |
developerId | number | — | The developer id of the app |
chattingLabel | string | — | The name of the QQ group, if not provided, can be empty |
chattingNumber | string | — | The number of the QQ group, if not provided, can be empty |
screenOrientation | number | — | The screen orientation of the app, 1: vertical, 2: horizontal, if not provided, can be empty |
Parameters from the server's own tool schema.
The tool creates or modifies app configuration data reversibly on the TapTap platform. Users can re-edit these fields, making this a Write operation rather than Destructive. The blast radius is medium because corrupted metadata could affect app discoverability and user experience, but can be corrected.
From the tool's definition Tool performs 'edit' operations on app metadata fields: name, genre, description, chatting_label, chatting_number, screen_orientation. These are modifiable attributes that do not permanently delete data.
Attacks that exploit this kind of access
user wants to edit the app's(game's) name, genre, description, chatting_label, chatting_number, screen_orientation on TapTap platform. It is categorised as a Write tool in the Tds MCP Server, which means it can create or modify data. Consider rate limits to prevent runaway writes.
tap_edit_app accepts 8 parameters: appId, genre, appName, description, developerId, chattingLabel, chattingNumber, screenOrientation. The full parameter table on this page comes from the server's own tool schema.
Register the Tds MCP server in PolicyLayer and add a rule for tap_edit_app: allow, deny, rate-limit, or require approval. Point your MCP client at the PolicyLayer proxy URL and the rule is enforced on every call, before it reaches Tds. Nothing to install.
tap_edit_app is a Write tool with medium risk. Write tools should be rate-limited to prevent accidental bulk modifications.
Yes. Add a rate_limit block to the tap_edit_app rule in your PolicyLayer policy. For example, setting max: 10 and window: 60 limits the tool to 10 calls per minute. Rate limits are tracked per agent session and reset automatically.
Set action: deny in the PolicyLayer policy for tap_edit_app. The AI agent will receive a policy violation error and cannot call the tool. You can also include a reason field to explain why the tool is blocked.
tap_edit_app is provided by the Tds MCP server (@taptap/tds-mcp-server). PolicyLayer sits as a proxy in front of this server to enforce policies before tool calls reach the server.
Every MCP server has a record like this.
Type a name, get the same breakdown: verified identity, auth posture, risk grade, capabilities, recommended policy.
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