AI agents call tap_get_all_app to retrieve information from Tds without modifying anything — typically the context-gathering step in research, monitoring, and reporting workflows, before the agent takes action elsewhere.
This tool fetches a list of games from the TapTap platform, which is a read-only operation. No data is created, modified, or deleted. The blast radius of misuse is low since it only retrieves publicly available game listings.
From the tool's definition 'get all the games on TapTap platform' — retrieves/lists data with no side effects
Attacks that exploit this kind of access
user wants to get all the games on TapTap platform. It is categorised as a Read tool in the Tds MCP Server, which means it retrieves data without modifying state.
Register the Tds MCP server in PolicyLayer and add a rule for tap_get_all_app: allow, deny, rate-limit, or require approval. Point your MCP client at the PolicyLayer proxy URL and the rule is enforced on every call, before it reaches Tds. Nothing to install.
tap_get_all_app is a Read tool with low risk. Read-only tools are generally safe to allow by default.
Yes. Add a rate_limit block to the tap_get_all_app rule in your PolicyLayer policy. For example, setting max: 10 and window: 60 limits the tool to 10 calls per minute. Rate limits are tracked per agent session and reset automatically.
Set action: deny in the PolicyLayer policy for tap_get_all_app. The AI agent will receive a policy violation error and cannot call the tool. You can also include a reason field to explain why the tool is blocked.
tap_get_all_app is provided by the Tds MCP server (@taptap/tds-mcp-server). PolicyLayer sits as a proxy in front of this server to enforce policies before tool calls reach the server.
Every MCP server has a record like this.
Type a name, get the same breakdown: verified identity, auth posture, risk grade, capabilities, recommended policy.
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