管理 CloudBase 云存储文件，仅用于 COS/Storage 对象，不用于静态网站托管。支持上传文件/目录、下载文件/目录、删除文件/目录等操作。删除操作需要设置force=true进行确认，防止误删除重要文件。注意：上传后返回的 temporaryUrl 是临时签名链接，1小时后过期，不要当作永久公网地址写入配置或持久化存储。工具还会基于 DescribeEnvs 返回的 Storages[0].CdnDomain 推导 publicUrl，⚠️ 警告：publicUrl 仅在存储桶 ACL 为公有读（所有用户可读）时才能被匿名访问；默认私有读写存储桶返回的 publicUrl...
AI agents use manageStorage to create or update resources in CloudBase MCP — usually the action step of a workflow, after the agent has gathered context. Every call changes real data in your CloudBase MCP environment.
While the tool supports destructive operations (delete), the required force=true confirmation flag and explicit warning against accidental deletion suggests the primary threat model is Write (upload/modify) rather than casual Destructive usage. However, the capability to delete files/directories with confirmation elevates severity to high.
From the tool's definition Tool description explicitly states support for 'uploading files/directories, downloading files/directories, deleting files/directories' (上传文件/目录、下载文件/目录、删除文件/目录等操作). Deletion requires force=true confirmation to prevent accidental deletion.
Documented attack patterns abuse exactly the kind of access manageStorage gives an agent:
PolicyLayer is an MCP gateway — it sits between your AI agents and CloudBase MCP, and nothing reaches the server without passing your rules. This is the rule we recommend for manageStorage:
{
"version": "1",
"default": "deny",
"tools": {
"manageStorage": {
"limits": [
{
"counter": "managestorage_rate",
"window": "minute",
"max": 30,
"scope": "grant"
}
]
}
}
}manageStorage stays usable, but capped — an agent stuck in a loop can't make hundreds of changes a minute. Everything else on the server is denied unless you say otherwise.
Free to start. No card required.
管理 CloudBase 云存储文件，仅用于 COS/Storage 对象，不用于静态网站托管。支持上传文件/目录、下载文件/目录、删除文件/目录等操作。删除操作需要设置force=true进行确认，防止误删除重要文件。注意：上传后返回的 temporaryUrl 是临时签名链接，1小时后过期，不要当作永久公网地址写入配置或持久化存储。工具还会基于 DescribeEnvs 返回的 Storages[0].CdnDomain 推导 publicUrl，⚠️ 警告：publicUrl 仅在存储桶 ACL 为公有读（所有用户可读）时才能被匿名访问；默认私有读写存储桶返回的 publicUrl 会 403，此时请继续使用 temporaryUrl 或先通过控制台/SDK 将目标路径设置为公有读。\n\n💡 存储桶 ACL 权限管理请使用 permissions 工具：queryPermissions(action=\. It is categorised as a Write tool in the CloudBase MCP MCP Server, which means it can create or modify data. Consider rate limits to prevent runaway writes.
Register the CloudBase MCP server in PolicyLayer and add a rule for manageStorage: allow, deny, rate-limit, or require approval. Point your MCP client at the PolicyLayer proxy URL and the rule is enforced on every call, before it reaches CloudBase MCP. Nothing to install.
manageStorage is a Write tool with medium risk. Write tools should be rate-limited to prevent accidental bulk modifications.
Yes. Add a rate_limit block to the manageStorage rule in your PolicyLayer policy. For example, setting max: 10 and window: 60 limits the tool to 10 calls per minute. Rate limits are tracked per agent session and reset automatically.
Set action: deny in the PolicyLayer policy for manageStorage. The AI agent will receive a policy violation error and cannot call the tool. You can also include a reason field to explain why the tool is blocked.
manageStorage is provided by the CloudBase MCP server (tencentcloudbase/cloudbase-mcp). PolicyLayer sits as a proxy in front of this server to enforce policies before tool calls reach the server.
Deterministic rules across all 8 CloudBase MCP tools. Per-identity grants. Full audit log. Live in minutes. Nothing to install.
Free to start. No card required.
8 CloudBase MCP tools catalogued and risk-classified — across an index of 42,500+ MCP servers.