AI agents use telegram_send_typing to create or update resources in Tgfmcp — usually the action step of a workflow, after the agent has gathered context. Every call changes real data in your Tgfmcp environment.
An AI agent can call telegram_send_typing faster than any human can review — one bad instruction and it creates or modifies resources in Tgfmcp by the hundred, each call as confident as the last.
Attacks that exploit this kind of access
Show the typing indicator in a target Telegram chat. It is categorised as a Write tool in the Tgfmcp MCP Server, which means it can create or modify data. Consider rate limits to prevent runaway writes.
Register the Tgf MCP server in PolicyLayer and add a rule for telegram_send_typing: allow, deny, rate-limit, or require approval. Point your MCP client at the PolicyLayer proxy URL and the rule is enforced on every call, before it reaches Tgfmcp. Nothing to install.
telegram_send_typing is a Write tool with medium risk. Write tools should be rate-limited to prevent accidental bulk modifications.
Yes. Add a rate_limit block to the telegram_send_typing rule in your PolicyLayer policy. For example, setting max: 10 and window: 60 limits the tool to 10 calls per minute. Rate limits are tracked per agent session and reset automatically.
Set action: deny in the PolicyLayer policy for telegram_send_typing. The AI agent will receive a policy violation error and cannot call the tool. You can also include a reason field to explain why the tool is blocked.
telegram_send_typing is provided by the Tgf MCP server (tgfmcp). PolicyLayer sits as a proxy in front of this server to enforce policies before tool calls reach the server.