select_server
AI agents use select_server to create or update resources in Remote Terminal — usually the action step of a workflow, after the agent has gathered context. Every call changes real data in your Remote Terminal environment.
An AI agent can call select_server faster than any human can review — one bad instruction and it creates or modifies resources in Remote Terminal by the hundred, each call as confident as the last.
Attacks that exploit this kind of access
select_server. It is categorised as a Write tool in the Remote Terminal MCP Server, which means it can create or modify data. Consider rate limits to prevent runaway writes.
Register the Remote Terminal MCP server in PolicyLayer and add a rule for select_server: allow, deny, rate-limit, or require approval. Point your MCP client at the PolicyLayer proxy URL and the rule is enforced on every call, before it reaches Remote Terminal. Nothing to install.
select_server is a Write tool with medium risk. Write tools should be rate-limited to prevent accidental bulk modifications.
Yes. Add a rate_limit block to the select_server rule in your PolicyLayer policy. For example, setting max: 10 and window: 60 limits the tool to 10 calls per minute. Rate limits are tracked per agent session and reset automatically.
Set action: deny in the PolicyLayer policy for select_server. The AI agent will receive a policy violation error and cannot call the tool. You can also include a reason field to explain why the tool is blocked.
select_server is provided by the Remote Terminal MCP server (tim00r/remote-terminal). PolicyLayer sits as a proxy in front of this server to enforce policies before tool calls reach the server.