AI agents invoke repeater_from_history to trigger actions in Burp Mcp Plus. What it does depends on the arguments the agent supplies, and its effects often reach beyond the immediate call — builds kicked off, notifications sent, workflows started.
Based on the tool name and server context, this tool likely loads a historical HTTP request into Burp Suite's Repeater, which can then execute/replay HTTP requests against targets. The sibling tool 'dedup_to_repeater' confirms the pattern of sending requests to Repeater. This constitutes an Execute-level action as it triggers external HTTP operations. Confidence is reduced due to empty description.
From the tool's definition Tool name 'repeater_from_history' and server context 'Burp Suite integration' with sibling tools like 'dedup_to_repeater' and 'intruder_from_history' suggest sending HTTP requests via Burp Suite's Repeater tool
Documented attack patterns abuse exactly the kind of access repeater_from_history gives an agent:
PolicyLayer is an MCP gateway — it sits between your AI agents and Burp Mcp Plus, and nothing reaches the server without passing your rules. This is the rule we recommend for repeater_from_history:
{
"version": "1",
"default": "deny",
"tools": {
"repeater_from_history": {
"limits": [
{
"counter": "repeater_from_history_rate",
"window": "minute",
"max": 10,
"scope": "grant"
}
]
}
}
} repeater_from_history stays usable, but rate-capped — a runaway agent can't fire it dozens of times a minute. Everything else on the server is denied unless you say otherwise.
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repeater_from_history. It is categorised as a Execute tool in the Burp Mcp Plus MCP Server, which means it can trigger actions or run processes. Use rate limits and argument validation.
Register the Burp Mcp Plus MCP server in PolicyLayer and add a rule for repeater_from_history: allow, deny, rate-limit, or require approval. Point your MCP client at the PolicyLayer proxy URL and the rule is enforced on every call, before it reaches Burp Mcp Plus. Nothing to install.
repeater_from_history is a Execute tool with high risk. Execute tools should be rate-limited and have argument validation enabled.
Yes. Add a rate_limit block to the repeater_from_history rule in your PolicyLayer policy. For example, setting max: 10 and window: 60 limits the tool to 10 calls per minute. Rate limits are tracked per agent session and reset automatically.
Set action: deny in the PolicyLayer policy for repeater_from_history. The AI agent will receive a policy violation error and cannot call the tool. You can also include a reason field to explain why the tool is blocked.
repeater_from_history is provided by the Burp Mcp Plus MCP server (titaniumtushar/burp-mcp-plus). PolicyLayer sits as a proxy in front of this server to enforce policies before tool calls reach the server.
Start from Burp Mcp Plus, add the rest of your stack, and see everything your agents can call. Then put policy on all of it.
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20 Burp Mcp Plus tools catalogued and risk-classified — across an index of 43,000+ MCP servers.