Opens a browser for interactive portal login and stores the JWT.
AI agents call auth.login to retrieve information from Tlc Portal without modifying anything — typically the context-gathering step in research, monitoring, and reporting workflows, before the agent takes action elsewhere.
Even though auth.login only reads data, uncontrolled read access leaks sensitive information and racks up API costs — an agent caught in a retry loop can make thousands of calls a minute without anyone noticing.
Attacks that exploit this kind of access
Opens a browser for interactive portal login and stores the JWT. It is categorised as a Read tool in the Tlc Portal MCP Server, which means it retrieves data without modifying state.
Register the Tlc Portal MCP server in PolicyLayer and add a rule for auth.login: allow, deny, rate-limit, or require approval. Point your MCP client at the PolicyLayer proxy URL and the rule is enforced on every call, before it reaches Tlc Portal. Nothing to install.
auth.login is a Read tool with low risk. Read-only tools are generally safe to allow by default.
Yes. Add a rate_limit block to the auth.login rule in your PolicyLayer policy. For example, setting max: 10 and window: 60 limits the tool to 10 calls per minute. Rate limits are tracked per agent session and reset automatically.
Set action: deny in the PolicyLayer policy for auth.login. The AI agent will receive a policy violation error and cannot call the tool. You can also include a reason field to explain why the tool is blocked.
auth.login is provided by the Tlc Portal MCP server (mingovvv/tlc-portal-mcp). PolicyLayer sits as a proxy in front of this server to enforce policies before tool calls reach the server.
Every MCP server has a record like this.
Type a name, get the same breakdown: verified identity, auth posture, risk grade, capabilities, recommended policy.
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