Send input to a running process in a specified window.
AI agents invoke send_input to trigger actions in Persistent Shell MCP. What it does depends on the arguments the agent supplies, and its effects often reach beyond the immediate call — builds kicked off, notifications sent, workflows started.
This tool sends input to an already-running process within a persistent tmux session. Depending on what the target process is (shell, interpreter, application), arbitrary input could trigger destructive or dangerous operations. The effect is Execute since it drives external process behavior based on arguments, with high severity due to the persistent shell context where misuse could cause significant harm.
From the tool's definition Send input to a running process in a specified window
Attacks that exploit this kind of access
Send input to a running process in a specified window. It is categorised as a Execute tool in the Persistent Shell MCP MCP Server, which means it can trigger actions or run processes. Use rate limits and argument validation.
Register the Persistent Shell MCP server in PolicyLayer and add a rule for send_input: allow, deny, rate-limit, or require approval. Point your MCP client at the PolicyLayer proxy URL and the rule is enforced on every call, before it reaches Persistent Shell MCP. Nothing to install.
send_input is a Execute tool with high risk. Execute tools should be rate-limited and have argument validation enabled.
Yes. Add a rate_limit block to the send_input rule in your PolicyLayer policy. For example, setting max: 10 and window: 60 limits the tool to 10 calls per minute. Rate limits are tracked per agent session and reset automatically.
Set action: deny in the PolicyLayer policy for send_input. The AI agent will receive a policy violation error and cannot call the tool. You can also include a reason field to explain why the tool is blocked.
send_input is provided by the Persistent Shell MCP server (tntisdial/persistent-shell-mcp). PolicyLayer sits as a proxy in front of this server to enforce policies before tool calls reach the server.
Every MCP server has a record like this.
Type a name, get the same breakdown: verified identity, auth posture, risk grade, capabilities, recommended policy.
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