ID of the appliance/device to control
AI agents invoke control_switch to trigger actions in Plugwise MCP Server. What it does depends on the arguments the agent supplies, and its effects often reach beyond the immediate call — builds kicked off, notifications sent, workflows started.
Controlling a switch triggers real-world physical effects (turning devices on/off), which is an external operation whose effects depend on arguments. This falls under Execute as it triggers external operations. Misuse could affect heating, appliances, or other critical home systems. Confidence is slightly reduced because the description is uninformative and doesn't explicitly detail the action taken.
From the tool's definition 'control_switch' — controls a switch device; description only states 'ID of the appliance/device to control' which implies toggling/operating physical smart home switches
Attacks that exploit this kind of access
ID of the appliance/device to control. It is categorised as a Execute tool in the Plugwise MCP Server MCP Server, which means it can trigger actions or run processes. Use rate limits and argument validation.
Register the Plugwise MCP Server MCP server in PolicyLayer and add a rule for control_switch: allow, deny, rate-limit, or require approval. Point your MCP client at the PolicyLayer proxy URL and the rule is enforced on every call, before it reaches Plugwise MCP Server. Nothing to install.
control_switch is a Execute tool with high risk. Execute tools should be rate-limited and have argument validation enabled.
Yes. Add a rate_limit block to the control_switch rule in your PolicyLayer policy. For example, setting max: 10 and window: 60 limits the tool to 10 calls per minute. Rate limits are tracked per agent session and reset automatically.
Set action: deny in the PolicyLayer policy for control_switch. The AI agent will receive a policy violation error and cannot call the tool. You can also include a reason field to explain why the tool is blocked.
control_switch is provided by the Plugwise MCP Server MCP server (tommertom/plugwise-mcp). PolicyLayer sits as a proxy in front of this server to enforce policies before tool calls reach the server.
Every MCP server has a record like this.
Type a name, get the same breakdown: verified identity, auth posture, risk grade, capabilities, recommended policy.
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