List active and revoked Drive sync-device passwords for the account. Returns id, label, scopes, mailbox binding, created_via (dashboard/webmail/api), created_at, last_used_at, expires_at, revoked_at, is_active. Never returns the plaintext password or its hash. Token mailbox_ids constraint is hono...
AI agents call drive_device_list to retrieve information from TrekMail MCP Server without modifying anything — typically the context-gathering step in research, monitoring, and reporting workflows, before the agent takes action elsewhere.
This tool retrieves and lists metadata about Drive sync-device passwords without modifying, deleting, or executing anything. It returns only informational fields and explicitly does not expose sensitive password data. The operation is read-only with no reversible or irreversible changes to data. Access is properly scoped by token constraints (mailbox_ids), reducing blast radius.
From the tool's definition The tool description explicitly states it 'List[s] active and revoked Drive sync-device passwords' and specifies the fields returned (id, label, scopes, mailbox binding, created_via, created_at, last_used_at, expires_at, revoked_at, is_active).
Attacks that exploit this kind of access
List active and revoked Drive sync-device passwords for the account. Returns id, label, scopes, mailbox binding, created_via (dashboard/webmail/api), created_at, last_used_at, expires_at, revoked_at, is_active. Never returns the plaintext password or its hash. Token mailbox_ids constraint is honored — a mailbox-bound token sees only its own mailbox. It is categorised as a Read tool in the TrekMail MCP Server MCP Server, which means it retrieves data without modifying state.
Register the TrekMail MCP Server MCP server in PolicyLayer and add a rule for drive_device_list: allow, deny, rate-limit, or require approval. Point your MCP client at the PolicyLayer proxy URL and the rule is enforced on every call, before it reaches TrekMail MCP Server. Nothing to install.
drive_device_list is a Read tool with low risk. Read-only tools are generally safe to allow by default.
Yes. Add a rate_limit block to the drive_device_list rule in your PolicyLayer policy. For example, setting max: 10 and window: 60 limits the tool to 10 calls per minute. Rate limits are tracked per agent session and reset automatically.
Set action: deny in the PolicyLayer policy for drive_device_list. The AI agent will receive a policy violation error and cannot call the tool. You can also include a reason field to explain why the tool is blocked.
drive_device_list is provided by the TrekMail MCP Server MCP server (trekmail/mcp-server). PolicyLayer sits as a proxy in front of this server to enforce policies before tool calls reach the server.
Every MCP server has a record like this.
Type a name, get the same breakdown: verified identity, auth posture, risk grade, capabilities, recommended policy.
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