Permanently revoke a Drive sync-device password. The sync client using it will lose access on its next request (no grace). Idempotent: revoking an already-revoked row is a no-op. Cannot be undone — to give the same client access again, create a fresh device password.
AI agents call drive_device_revoke to permanently remove resources in TrekMail MCP Server — typically in cleanup and lifecycle workflows. It does its job in a single call, and there is no undo.
This tool revokes device access credentials in a way that cannot be reversed. While the action itself doesn't delete data, it permanently and irrevocably terminates a sync client's authentication credentials, which is a destructive access-control operation. Misuse by an AI agent could lock legitimate users out of their synchronized devices with no recovery path (a new device password must be created separately).
From the tool's definition Tool description explicitly states: 'Permanently revoke', 'Cannot be undone', and 'will lose access on its next request (no grace)'. These are hallmarks of irreversible actions.
Attacks that exploit this kind of access
Permanently revoke a Drive sync-device password. The sync client using it will lose access on its next request (no grace). Idempotent: revoking an already-revoked row is a no-op. Cannot be undone — to give the same client access again, create a fresh device password. It is categorised as a Destructive tool in the TrekMail MCP Server MCP Server, which means it can permanently delete or destroy data. Block by default and require explicit approval.
Register the TrekMail MCP Server MCP server in PolicyLayer and add a rule for drive_device_revoke: allow, deny, rate-limit, or require approval. Point your MCP client at the PolicyLayer proxy URL and the rule is enforced on every call, before it reaches TrekMail MCP Server. Nothing to install.
drive_device_revoke is a Destructive tool with critical risk. Critical-risk tools should be blocked by default and only enabled with explicit human approval.
Yes. Add a rate_limit block to the drive_device_revoke rule in your PolicyLayer policy. For example, setting max: 10 and window: 60 limits the tool to 10 calls per minute. Rate limits are tracked per agent session and reset automatically.
Set action: deny in the PolicyLayer policy for drive_device_revoke. The AI agent will receive a policy violation error and cannot call the tool. You can also include a reason field to explain why the tool is blocked.
drive_device_revoke is provided by the TrekMail MCP Server MCP server (trekmail/mcp-server). PolicyLayer sits as a proxy in front of this server to enforce policies before tool calls reach the server.
Every MCP server has a record like this.
Type a name, get the same breakdown: verified identity, auth posture, risk grade, capabilities, recommended policy.
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