drive_device_rotate
Atomic credential rotation: revoke the old row and mint a new one inheriting label, scopes, and mailbox binding. The new plaintext password is returned in data.password (one-time). The old password stops working immediately. Optional expires_in_days overrides the inherited expiry — omit to keep t...
This record as markdown: /tools/trekmail-mcp-server/drive-device-rotate.md
What drive_device_rotate does on TrekMail MCP Server
AI agents invoke drive_device_rotate to trigger actions in TrekMail MCP Server. What it does depends on the arguments the agent supplies, and its effects often reach beyond the immediate call: builds kicked off, notifications sent, workflows started.
Why drive_device_rotate is rated High
This tool revokes existing credentials and generates new ones atomically. It triggers external operations (credential invalidation and creation) with immediate, partially irreversible effects (old password stops working immediately).
From the tool's definition Atomic credential rotation: revoke the old row and mint a new one... The old password stops working immediately.
Attacks that exploit this kind of access
The rule that runs drive_device_rotate safely
PolicyLayer is an MCP gateway: it sits between your AI agents and TrekMail MCP Server, and checks every tool call against a rule you set before the call runs. Nothing changes on the server itself. For drive_device_rotate, this is the rule to start with:
drive_device_rotate stays usable, but rate-capped: a runaway agent can't fire it dozens of times a minute. Everything else on the server is denied unless you say otherwise.
The button opens the PolicyLayer dashboard: create your workspace, connect TrekMail MCP Server, apply this rule, and every drive_device_rotate call is checked against it from then on.
Questions about drive_device_rotate
Atomic credential rotation: revoke the old row and mint a new one inheriting label, scopes, and mailbox binding. The new plaintext password is returned in data.password (one-time). The old password stops working immediately. Optional expires_in_days overrides the inherited expiry — omit to keep the original window. Rate-limited 10/hour per account. Use this for scheduled credential rotation, NOT for changing scopes (revoke + create a new one for that). It is categorised as a Execute tool in the TrekMail MCP Server MCP Server, which means it can trigger actions or run processes. Use rate limits and argument validation.
Register the TrekMail MCP Server MCP server in PolicyLayer and add a rule for drive_device_rotate: allow, deny, rate-limit, or require approval. Point your MCP client at the PolicyLayer proxy URL and the rule is enforced on every call, before it reaches TrekMail MCP Server. Nothing to install.
drive_device_rotate is a Execute tool with high risk. Execute tools should be rate-limited and have argument validation enabled.
Yes. Add a rate_limit block to the drive_device_rotate rule in your PolicyLayer policy. For example, setting max: 10 and window: 60 limits the tool to 10 calls per minute. Rate limits are tracked per agent session and reset automatically.
Set action: deny in the PolicyLayer policy for drive_device_rotate. The AI agent will receive a policy violation error and cannot call the tool. You can also include a reason field to explain why the tool is blocked.
drive_device_rotate is provided by the TrekMail MCP Server MCP server (trekmail/mcp-server). PolicyLayer sits as a proxy in front of this server to enforce policies before tool calls reach the server.
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