AI agents invoke debugpy_continue to trigger actions in Debugpy. What it does depends on the arguments the agent supplies, and its effects often reach beyond the immediate call — builds kicked off, notifications sent, workflows started.
The tool resumes execution of a paused/debugged Python process, which is an active operation that triggers external process execution. Misuse could cause a suspended process to continue running unintended code paths, making it an Execute-category action with medium severity.
From the tool's definition Resume execution
Attacks that exploit this kind of access
Resume execution. It is categorised as a Execute tool in the Debugpy MCP Server, which means it can trigger actions or run processes. Use rate limits and argument validation.
Register the Debugpy MCP server in PolicyLayer and add a rule for debugpy_continue: allow, deny, rate-limit, or require approval. Point your MCP client at the PolicyLayer proxy URL and the rule is enforced on every call, before it reaches Debugpy. Nothing to install.
debugpy_continue is a Execute tool with high risk. Execute tools should be rate-limited and have argument validation enabled.
Yes. Add a rate_limit block to the debugpy_continue rule in your PolicyLayer policy. For example, setting max: 10 and window: 60 limits the tool to 10 calls per minute. Rate limits are tracked per agent session and reset automatically.
Set action: deny in the PolicyLayer policy for debugpy_continue. The AI agent will receive a policy violation error and cannot call the tool. You can also include a reason field to explain why the tool is blocked.
debugpy_continue is provided by the Debugpy MCP server (will-garrett/debugpy-mcp). PolicyLayer sits as a proxy in front of this server to enforce policies before tool calls reach the server.
Every MCP server has a record like this.
Type a name, get the same breakdown: verified identity, auth posture, risk grade, capabilities, recommended policy.
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