Launch a new browser instance (chromium, firefox, or webkit)
AI agents invoke launch_browser to trigger actions in AutoProbeMCP. What it does depends on the arguments the agent supplies, and its effects often reach beyond the immediate call — builds kicked off, notifications sent, workflows started.
launch_browser triggers real processes with real consequences. An agent gone sideways doesn't fire it once — it starts dozens of builds, sends mass notifications, or burns through compute before anyone looks up.
Attacks that exploit this kind of access
Launch a new browser instance (chromium, firefox, or webkit). It is categorised as a Execute tool in the AutoProbeMCP MCP Server, which means it can trigger actions or run processes. Use rate limits and argument validation.
Register the AutoProbe MCP server in PolicyLayer and add a rule for launch_browser: allow, deny, rate-limit, or require approval. Point your MCP client at the PolicyLayer proxy URL and the rule is enforced on every call, before it reaches AutoProbeMCP. Nothing to install.
launch_browser is a Execute tool with high risk. Execute tools should be rate-limited and have argument validation enabled.
Yes. Add a rate_limit block to the launch_browser rule in your PolicyLayer policy. For example, setting max: 10 and window: 60 limits the tool to 10 calls per minute. Rate limits are tracked per agent session and reset automatically.
Set action: deny in the PolicyLayer policy for launch_browser. The AI agent will receive a policy violation error and cannot call the tool. You can also include a reason field to explain why the tool is blocked.
launch_browser is provided by the AutoProbe MCP server (wladastic/autoprobemcp). PolicyLayer sits as a proxy in front of this server to enforce policies before tool calls reach the server.