从设备拉取文件到本地
AI agents call pull_file to retrieve information from Android ADB MCP Server without modifying anything — typically the context-gathering step in research, monitoring, and reporting workflows, before the agent takes action elsewhere.
Even though pull_file only reads data, uncontrolled read access leaks sensitive information and racks up API costs — an agent caught in a retry loop can make thousands of calls a minute without anyone noticing.
Attacks that exploit this kind of access
从设备拉取文件到本地. It is categorised as a Read tool in the Android ADB MCP Server MCP Server, which means it retrieves data without modifying state.
Register the Android ADB MCP Server MCP server in PolicyLayer and add a rule for pull_file: allow, deny, rate-limit, or require approval. Point your MCP client at the PolicyLayer proxy URL and the rule is enforced on every call, before it reaches Android ADB MCP Server. Nothing to install.
pull_file is a Read tool with low risk. Read-only tools are generally safe to allow by default.
Yes. Add a rate_limit block to the pull_file rule in your PolicyLayer policy. For example, setting max: 10 and window: 60 limits the tool to 10 calls per minute. Rate limits are tracked per agent session and reset automatically.
Set action: deny in the PolicyLayer policy for pull_file. The AI agent will receive a policy violation error and cannot call the tool. You can also include a reason field to explain why the tool is blocked.
pull_file is provided by the Android ADB MCP Server MCP server (xuegao-tzx/android-adb-mcp). PolicyLayer sits as a proxy in front of this server to enforce policies before tool calls reach the server.