AI agents use build_lp_withdraw to commit financial operations through Agent — usually the final step of a payment, billing, or trading workflow. A call moves real money.
| Parameter | Type | Required | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
vault | string | Yes | Known any-token LP vault address. |
shares | string | Yes | Vault shares to burn (base-unit integer string). |
chainId | integer | Yes | EVM chain id (mainnet = 1 in v1). |
recipient | string | Yes | Recipient / payer address (the wallet that signs + receives). |
outputToken | string | Yes | Token to receive on withdraw. |
slippageBps | integer | — | Optional slippage budget in basis points (0–10000). |
Parameters from the server's own tool schema.
While the tool itself only builds the transaction (no broadcast), it constructs a complete financial operation to withdraw liquidity pool assets. The sequence — approve shares, Permit2 sign, withdrawAnyToken — directly moves financial assets (LP shares → tokens). Building the transaction payload is the critical step enabling the financial transfer; misuse could result in unauthorized withdrawal of liquidity.
From the tool's definition 'LP withdraw plan (approve shares → Permit2 sign → router.withdrawAnyToken)' — builds a transaction that moves liquidity pool shares out, returning tokens to the caller; financial asset movement
Attacks that exploit this kind of access
Build a NON-CUSTODIAL any-token LP withdraw plan (approve shares → Permit2 sign → router.withdrawAnyToken) for the caller to sign + broadcast. No broadcast. It is categorised as a Financial tool in the Agent MCP Server, which means it involves financial transactions. Block by default and require explicit approval.
build_lp_withdraw accepts 6 parameters: vault, shares, chainId, recipient, outputToken, slippageBps. Required: vault, shares, chainId, recipient, outputToken. The full parameter table on this page comes from the server's own tool schema.
Register the Agent MCP server in PolicyLayer and add a rule for build_lp_withdraw: allow, deny, rate-limit, or require approval. Point your MCP client at the PolicyLayer proxy URL and the rule is enforced on every call, before it reaches Agent. Nothing to install.
build_lp_withdraw is a Financial tool with critical risk. Critical-risk tools should be blocked by default and only enabled with explicit human approval.
Yes. Add a rate_limit block to the build_lp_withdraw rule in your PolicyLayer policy. For example, setting max: 10 and window: 60 limits the tool to 10 calls per minute. Rate limits are tracked per agent session and reset automatically.
Set action: deny in the PolicyLayer policy for build_lp_withdraw. The AI agent will receive a policy violation error and cannot call the tool. You can also include a reason field to explain why the tool is blocked.
build_lp_withdraw is provided by the Agent MCP server (https://fluxiq.xyz/api/mcp). PolicyLayer sits as a proxy in front of this server to enforce policies before tool calls reach the server.
build_lp_withdraw is one line of Agent's registry record.
The record carries the whole server: verified identity, auth posture, risk grade, every tool classified, recommended policy — re-checked continuously.
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