adb_input_text

Type text on the device (audited).

SERVERLocalAnt SOURCEyuga-hashimoto/localant

High RISK CLASS

Category Execute

Parameters 00 required

Recommended Rate-limitedsee the rule below

Registry record Grade F, identity unverified Pull the record →

This record as markdown: /tools/yuga-hashimoto-localant/adb-input-text.md

WHAT IT DOES

What adb_input_text does on LocalAnt

AI agents invoke adb_input_text to trigger actions in LocalAnt. What it does depends on the arguments the agent supplies, and its effects often reach beyond the immediate call: builds kicked off, notifications sent, workflows started.

RISK

Why adb_input_text is rated High

This tool sends keystrokes/text input to a physical or emulated Android device. It executes an external operation (ADB input) whose effects depend on arguments — text could be typed into any active field including passwords, commands, or forms. The server description confirms this is part of a suite for PC/device control via shell and automation tools.

From the tool's definition 'Type text on the device' — triggers external input operation on a connected Android device via ADB

Attacks that exploit this kind of access

RECOMMENDED RULE

The rule that runs adb_input_text safely

PolicyLayer is an MCP gateway: it sits between your AI agents and LocalAnt, and checks every tool call against a rule you set before the call runs. Nothing changes on the server itself. For adb_input_text, this is the rule to start with:

adb_input_text Rate-limited

adb_input_text stays usable, but rate-capped: a runaway agent can't fire it dozens of times a minute. Everything else on the server is denied unless you say otherwise.

View as policy code

policy.json

{
  "version": "1",
  "default": "deny",
  "tools": {
    "adb_input_text": {
      "limits": [
        {
          "counter": "adb_input_text_rate",
          "window": "minute",
          "max": 10,
          "scope": "grant"
        }
      ]
    }
  }
}

RATE-LIMIT THIS TOOL → Instant setup, no code required.

The button opens the PolicyLayer dashboard: create your workspace, connect LocalAnt, apply this rule, and every adb_input_text call is checked against it from then on.

FAQ

Questions about adb_input_text

What does the adb_input_text tool do? +

Type text on the device (audited). It is categorised as a Execute tool in the LocalAnt MCP Server, which means it can trigger actions or run processes. Use rate limits and argument validation.

How do I enforce a policy on adb_input_text? +

Register the LocalAnt MCP server in PolicyLayer and add a rule for adb_input_text: allow, deny, rate-limit, or require approval. Point your MCP client at the PolicyLayer proxy URL and the rule is enforced on every call, before it reaches LocalAnt. Nothing to install.

What risk level is adb_input_text? +

adb_input_text is a Execute tool with high risk. Execute tools should be rate-limited and have argument validation enabled.

Can I rate-limit adb_input_text? +

Yes. Add a rate_limit block to the adb_input_text rule in your PolicyLayer policy. For example, setting max: 10 and window: 60 limits the tool to 10 calls per minute. Rate limits are tracked per agent session and reset automatically.

How do I block adb_input_text completely? +

Set action: deny in the PolicyLayer policy for adb_input_text. The AI agent will receive a policy violation error and cannot call the tool. You can also include a reason field to explain why the tool is blocked.

What MCP server provides adb_input_text? +

adb_input_text is provided by the LocalAnt MCP server (yuga-hashimoto/localant). PolicyLayer sits as a proxy in front of this server to enforce policies before tool calls reach the server.

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