adb_shell
Run an adb shell command. Dangerous commands (rm -rf, reboot, wipe, …) are rejected. Risk 3.
This record as markdown: /tools/yuga-hashimoto-localant/adb-shell.md
What adb_shell does on LocalAnt
AI agents invoke adb_shell to trigger actions in LocalAnt. What it does depends on the arguments the agent supplies, and its effects often reach beyond the immediate call: builds kicked off, notifications sent, workflows started.
Why adb_shell is rated High
Running shell commands on a remote Android device is Execute-category by definition. Even with a blocklist filtering the most destructive commands, arbitrary shell execution has a large blast radius: it can read/write files, launch apps, exfiltrate data, change settings, install packages, or execute code on the device.
From the tool's definition "Run an adb shell command" — executes arbitrary shell commands on a connected Android device via ADB; description acknowledges danger and notes "Dangerous commands (rm -rf, reboot, wipe, …) are rejected" and "Risk 3"
Attacks that exploit this kind of access
The rule that runs adb_shell safely
PolicyLayer is an MCP gateway: it sits between your AI agents and LocalAnt, and checks every tool call against a rule you set before the call runs. Nothing changes on the server itself. For adb_shell, this is the rule to start with:
adb_shell stays usable, but rate-capped: a runaway agent can't fire it dozens of times a minute. Everything else on the server is denied unless you say otherwise.
The button opens the PolicyLayer dashboard: create your workspace, connect LocalAnt, apply this rule, and every adb_shell call is checked against it from then on.
Questions about adb_shell
Run an adb shell command. Dangerous commands (rm -rf, reboot, wipe, …) are rejected. Risk 3. It is categorised as a Execute tool in the LocalAnt MCP Server, which means it can trigger actions or run processes. Use rate limits and argument validation.
Register the LocalAnt MCP server in PolicyLayer and add a rule for adb_shell: allow, deny, rate-limit, or require approval. Point your MCP client at the PolicyLayer proxy URL and the rule is enforced on every call, before it reaches LocalAnt. Nothing to install.
adb_shell is a Execute tool with high risk. Execute tools should be rate-limited and have argument validation enabled.
Yes. Add a rate_limit block to the adb_shell rule in your PolicyLayer policy. For example, setting max: 10 and window: 60 limits the tool to 10 calls per minute. Rate limits are tracked per agent session and reset automatically.
Set action: deny in the PolicyLayer policy for adb_shell. The AI agent will receive a policy violation error and cannot call the tool. You can also include a reason field to explain why the tool is blocked.
adb_shell is provided by the LocalAnt MCP server (yuga-hashimoto/localant). PolicyLayer sits as a proxy in front of this server to enforce policies before tool calls reach the server.
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