This record as markdown: /tools/yuga-hashimoto-localant/browser-type.md
What browser_type does on LocalAnt
AI agents invoke browser_type to trigger actions in LocalAnt. What it does depends on the arguments the agent supplies, and its effects often reach beyond the immediate call: builds kicked off, notifications sent, workflows started.
Why browser_type is rated High
Typing into browser inputs can submit forms, trigger searches, enter credentials, or interact with web applications. This is a browser automation action (Execute category) since it performs an external operation whose effects depend on what is typed and into which element. It could have significant side effects (e.g., submitting sensitive data, triggering transactions), hence medium-to-high severity.
From the tool's definition 'Type into an input by selector' — triggers a browser automation action (keystroke input into a web element), which is an external operation with effects depending on arguments.
Attacks that exploit this kind of access
The rule that runs browser_type safely
PolicyLayer is an MCP gateway: it sits between your AI agents and LocalAnt, and checks every tool call against a rule you set before the call runs. Nothing changes on the server itself. For browser_type, this is the rule to start with:
browser_type stays usable, but rate-capped: a runaway agent can't fire it dozens of times a minute. Everything else on the server is denied unless you say otherwise.
The button opens the PolicyLayer dashboard: create your workspace, connect LocalAnt, apply this rule, and every browser_type call is checked against it from then on.
Questions about browser_type
Type into an input by selector. It is categorised as a Execute tool in the LocalAnt MCP Server, which means it can trigger actions or run processes. Use rate limits and argument validation.
Register the LocalAnt MCP server in PolicyLayer and add a rule for browser_type: allow, deny, rate-limit, or require approval. Point your MCP client at the PolicyLayer proxy URL and the rule is enforced on every call, before it reaches LocalAnt. Nothing to install.
browser_type is a Execute tool with high risk. Execute tools should be rate-limited and have argument validation enabled.
Yes. Add a rate_limit block to the browser_type rule in your PolicyLayer policy. For example, setting max: 10 and window: 60 limits the tool to 10 calls per minute. Rate limits are tracked per agent session and reset automatically.
Set action: deny in the PolicyLayer policy for browser_type. The AI agent will receive a policy violation error and cannot call the tool. You can also include a reason field to explain why the tool is blocked.
browser_type is provided by the LocalAnt MCP server (yuga-hashimoto/localant). PolicyLayer sits as a proxy in front of this server to enforce policies before tool calls reach the server.
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