shell_run_approved_command
Run an arbitrary command (still subject to the hard blocklist). Requires approval (risk 3).
This record as markdown: /tools/yuga-hashimoto-localant/shell-run-approved-command.md
What shell_run_approved_command does on LocalAnt
AI agents invoke shell_run_approved_command to trigger actions in LocalAnt. What it does depends on the arguments the agent supplies, and its effects often reach beyond the immediate call: builds kicked off, notifications sent, workflows started.
Why shell_run_approved_command is rated High
The tool executes shell commands, placing it firmly in the Execute category. Although it claims approval gating and a blocklist, arbitrary command execution—even with restrictions—carries high severity due to potential for lateral movement, data exfiltration, or system compromise if an AI agent crafts a malicious or unintended command.
From the tool's definition Tool runs 'arbitrary command' via shell, which executes code whose effects depend on the command argument. Description explicitly states it can run commands and is subject to a blocklist, confirming execution capability.
Attacks that exploit this kind of access
The rule that runs shell_run_approved_command safely
PolicyLayer is an MCP gateway: it sits between your AI agents and LocalAnt, and checks every tool call against a rule you set before the call runs. Nothing changes on the server itself. For shell_run_approved_command, this is the rule to start with:
shell_run_approved_command stays usable, but rate-capped: a runaway agent can't fire it dozens of times a minute. Everything else on the server is denied unless you say otherwise.
The button opens the PolicyLayer dashboard: create your workspace, connect LocalAnt, apply this rule, and every shell_run_approved_command call is checked against it from then on.
Questions about shell_run_approved_command
Run an arbitrary command (still subject to the hard blocklist). Requires approval (risk 3). It is categorised as a Execute tool in the LocalAnt MCP Server, which means it can trigger actions or run processes. Use rate limits and argument validation.
Register the LocalAnt MCP server in PolicyLayer and add a rule for shell_run_approved_command: allow, deny, rate-limit, or require approval. Point your MCP client at the PolicyLayer proxy URL and the rule is enforced on every call, before it reaches LocalAnt. Nothing to install.
shell_run_approved_command is a Execute tool with high risk. Execute tools should be rate-limited and have argument validation enabled.
Yes. Add a rate_limit block to the shell_run_approved_command rule in your PolicyLayer policy. For example, setting max: 10 and window: 60 limits the tool to 10 calls per minute. Rate limits are tracked per agent session and reset automatically.
Set action: deny in the PolicyLayer policy for shell_run_approved_command. The AI agent will receive a policy violation error and cannot call the tool. You can also include a reason field to explain why the tool is blocked.
shell_run_approved_command is provided by the LocalAnt MCP server (yuga-hashimoto/localant). PolicyLayer sits as a proxy in front of this server to enforce policies before tool calls reach the server.
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