Performs a transfer of funds between two Projects
AI agents use internal-transfer to commit financial operations through ZBD MCP Server — usually the final step of a payment, billing, or trading workflow. A call moves real money.
internal-transfer moves real money, and an autonomous agent will call it with the same confidence it calls a search tool. A misread instruction or an injected prompt is all it takes to drain an account or blow a budget.
Attacks that exploit this kind of access
Performs a transfer of funds between two Projects. It is categorised as a Financial tool in the ZBD MCP Server MCP Server, which means it involves financial transactions. Block by default and require explicit approval.
Register the ZBD MCP Server MCP server in PolicyLayer and add a rule for internal-transfer: allow, deny, rate-limit, or require approval. Point your MCP client at the PolicyLayer proxy URL and the rule is enforced on every call, before it reaches ZBD MCP Server. Nothing to install.
internal-transfer is a Financial tool with critical risk. Critical-risk tools should be blocked by default and only enabled with explicit human approval.
Yes. Add a rate_limit block to the internal-transfer rule in your PolicyLayer policy. For example, setting max: 10 and window: 60 limits the tool to 10 calls per minute. Rate limits are tracked per agent session and reset automatically.
Set action: deny in the PolicyLayer policy for internal-transfer. The AI agent will receive a policy violation error and cannot call the tool. You can also include a reason field to explain why the tool is blocked.
internal-transfer is provided by the ZBD MCP Server MCP server (zbdpay/zbd-mcp-server). PolicyLayer sits as a proxy in front of this server to enforce policies before tool calls reach the server.