删除待办事项
AI agents call delete_todo to permanently remove resources in Code Analysis MCP Server — typically in cleanup and lifecycle workflows. It does its job in a single call, and there is no undo.
The tool deletes a todo item, which is an irreversible removal of data. However, the blast radius is low since todo items are typically low-value metadata rather than critical business data.
From the tool's definition Tool name 'delete_todo' and description '删除待办事项' (meaning 'delete todo item')
Attacks that exploit this kind of access
删除待办事项. It is categorised as a Destructive tool in the Code Analysis MCP Server MCP Server, which means it can permanently delete or destroy data. Block by default and require explicit approval.
Register the Code Analysis MCP Server MCP server in PolicyLayer and add a rule for delete_todo: allow, deny, rate-limit, or require approval. Point your MCP client at the PolicyLayer proxy URL and the rule is enforced on every call, before it reaches Code Analysis MCP Server. Nothing to install.
delete_todo is a Destructive tool with critical risk. Critical-risk tools should be blocked by default and only enabled with explicit human approval.
Yes. Add a rate_limit block to the delete_todo rule in your PolicyLayer policy. For example, setting max: 10 and window: 60 limits the tool to 10 calls per minute. Rate limits are tracked per agent session and reset automatically.
Set action: deny in the PolicyLayer policy for delete_todo. The AI agent will receive a policy violation error and cannot call the tool. You can also include a reason field to explain why the tool is blocked.
delete_todo is provided by the Code Analysis MCP Server MCP server (zeocax/code-mcp). PolicyLayer sits as a proxy in front of this server to enforce policies before tool calls reach the server.
Every MCP server has a record like this.
Type a name, get the same breakdown: verified identity, auth posture, risk grade, capabilities, recommended policy.
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