AI agents use zeph_input to create or update resources in Zeph To — usually the action step of a workflow, after the agent has gathered context. Every call changes real data in your Zeph To environment.
An AI agent can call zeph_input faster than any human can review — one bad instruction and it creates or modifies resources in Zeph To by the hundred, each call as confident as the last.
Attacks that exploit this kind of access
Request text input from the user via push notification. The tool blocks until the user responds or the timeout is reached. Requires ZEPH_HOOK_ID environment variable. It is categorised as a Write tool in the Zeph To MCP Server, which means it can create or modify data. Consider rate limits to prevent runaway writes.
Register the Zeph To MCP server in PolicyLayer and add a rule for zeph_input: allow, deny, rate-limit, or require approval. Point your MCP client at the PolicyLayer proxy URL and the rule is enforced on every call, before it reaches Zeph To. Nothing to install.
zeph_input is a Write tool with medium risk. Write tools should be rate-limited to prevent accidental bulk modifications.
Yes. Add a rate_limit block to the zeph_input rule in your PolicyLayer policy. For example, setting max: 10 and window: 60 limits the tool to 10 calls per minute. Rate limits are tracked per agent session and reset automatically.
Set action: deny in the PolicyLayer policy for zeph_input. The AI agent will receive a policy violation error and cannot call the tool. You can also include a reason field to explain why the tool is blocked.
zeph_input is provided by the Zeph To MCP server (zeph-to/mcp-server). PolicyLayer sits as a proxy in front of this server to enforce policies before tool calls reach the server.
Every MCP server has a record like this.
Type a name, get the same breakdown: verified identity, auth posture, risk grade, capabilities, recommended policy.
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