AI agents use messages_sendText to create or update resources in Telegram — usually the action step of a workflow, after the agent has gathered context. Every call changes real data in your Telegram environment.
An AI agent can call messages_sendText faster than any human can review — one bad instruction and it creates or modifies resources in Telegram by the hundred, each call as confident as the last.
Attacks that exploit this kind of access
Send a text message to a chat. It is categorised as a Write tool in the Telegram MCP Server, which means it can create or modify data. Consider rate limits to prevent runaway writes.
Register the Telegram MCP server in PolicyLayer and add a rule for messages_sendText: allow, deny, rate-limit, or require approval. Point your MCP client at the PolicyLayer proxy URL and the rule is enforced on every call, before it reaches Telegram. Nothing to install.
messages_sendText is a Write tool with medium risk. Write tools should be rate-limited to prevent accidental bulk modifications.
Yes. Add a rate_limit block to the messages_sendText rule in your PolicyLayer policy. For example, setting max: 10 and window: 60 limits the tool to 10 calls per minute. Rate limits are tracked per agent session and reset automatically.
Set action: deny in the PolicyLayer policy for messages_sendText. The AI agent will receive a policy violation error and cannot call the tool. You can also include a reason field to explain why the tool is blocked.
messages_sendText is provided by the Telegram MCP server (zhigang1992/telegram-mcp). PolicyLayer sits as a proxy in front of this server to enforce policies before tool calls reach the server.