xhs_get_user_posted_notes_by_profile_url
根据主页链接、短链接或分享文案获取用户已发布笔记列表，支持 page_token 翻页。
This record as markdown: /tools/com-52choujiang-xhs-insights/xhs-get-user-posted-notes-by-profile-url.md
What xhs_get_user_posted_notes_by_profile_url does on SocialDataX 小红书 Xiaohongshu XHS RedNote MCP
AI agents call xhs_get_user_posted_notes_by_profile_url to retrieve information from SocialDataX 小红书 Xiaohongshu XHS RedNote MCP without modifying anything. It is typically the context-gathering step in research, monitoring, and reporting workflows, before the agent takes action elsewhere.
| Parameter | Type | Required | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
page_token | object | — | 分页令牌。首次请求留空；继续翻页时必须将上一页返回的完整 next_page_token 原样作为 page_token 传回。page_token 是不透明分页令牌；只能用于同一用户的发帖列表，不能跨用户复用；不得修改、截断、缩写、脱敏、掩码、省略、规范化、重组或自行生成，不得用省略号替换中间内容。 |
profile_url | string | Yes | 小红书主页链接、短链接或分享文案。支持以下形式：1) xiaohongshu.com/user/profile/... 主页长链；2) xhslink.com / xhslink.cn / xhsurl.com / xhsurl.cn 短链接；3) 包含上述任一链接的完整分享文案。请传主页链接，不要传笔记链接。 |
Parameters from the server's own tool schema.
Why xhs_get_user_posted_notes_by_profile_url is rated Low
Even though xhs_get_user_posted_notes_by_profile_url only reads data, uncontrolled read access leaks sensitive information and racks up API costs: an agent caught in a retry loop can make thousands of calls a minute without anyone noticing.
Attacks that exploit this kind of access
The rule that runs xhs_get_user_posted_notes_by_profile_url safely
PolicyLayer is an MCP gateway: it sits between your AI agents and SocialDataX 小红书 Xiaohongshu XHS RedNote MCP, and checks every tool call against a rule you set before the call runs. Nothing changes on the server itself. For xhs_get_user_posted_notes_by_profile_url, this is the rule to start with:
xhs_get_user_posted_notes_by_profile_url is read-only, so it stays allowed. Everything else on the server is denied unless you say otherwise.
The button opens the PolicyLayer dashboard: create your workspace, connect SocialDataX 小红书 Xiaohongshu XHS RedNote MCP, apply this rule, and every xhs_get_user_posted_notes_by_profile_url call is checked against it from then on.
Questions about xhs_get_user_posted_notes_by_profile_url
根据主页链接、短链接或分享文案获取用户已发布笔记列表，支持 page_token 翻页。. It is categorised as a Read tool in the SocialDataX 小红书 Xiaohongshu XHS RedNote MCP MCP Server, which means it retrieves data without modifying state.
xhs_get_user_posted_notes_by_profile_url accepts 2 parameters: page_token, profile_url. Required: profile_url. The full parameter table on this page comes from the server's own tool schema.
Register the SocialDataX 小红书 Xiaohongshu XHS RedNote MCP server in PolicyLayer and add a rule for xhs_get_user_posted_notes_by_profile_url: allow, deny, rate-limit, or require approval. Point your MCP client at the PolicyLayer proxy URL and the rule is enforced on every call, before it reaches SocialDataX 小红书 Xiaohongshu XHS RedNote MCP. Nothing to install.
xhs_get_user_posted_notes_by_profile_url is a Read tool with low risk. Read-only tools are generally safe to allow by default.
Yes. Add a rate_limit block to the xhs_get_user_posted_notes_by_profile_url rule in your PolicyLayer policy. For example, setting max: 10 and window: 60 limits the tool to 10 calls per minute. Rate limits are tracked per agent session and reset automatically.
Set action: deny in the PolicyLayer policy for xhs_get_user_posted_notes_by_profile_url. The AI agent will receive a policy violation error and cannot call the tool. You can also include a reason field to explain why the tool is blocked.
xhs_get_user_posted_notes_by_profile_url is provided by the SocialDataX 小红书 Xiaohongshu XHS RedNote MCP server (https://mcp.socialdatax.com/xhs/mcp). PolicyLayer sits as a proxy in front of this server to enforce policies before tool calls reach the server.
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