get_device_health
THE ONE QUERY (#1157/#1160): the latest capture-health projection for ONE device — one device_health row, no scan, no on-device access needed. Answers "is the TLS-intercept engine armed, and if not, WHY": engine_state ('armed'|'inert') + engine_reason (e.g. no_ca_key) + state_established_at (when...
This record as markdown: /tools/dev-busymate-busymate-devtools/get-device-health.md
What get_device_health does on Busymate DevTools
AI agents call get_device_health to retrieve information from Busymate DevTools without modifying anything. It is typically the context-gathering step in research, monitoring, and reporting workflows, before the agent takes action elsewhere.
| Parameter | Type | Required | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
deviceName | string | — | |
device_uuid | string | — |
Parameters from the server's own tool schema.
Why get_device_health is rated Low
Even though get_device_health only reads data, uncontrolled read access leaks sensitive information and racks up API costs: an agent caught in a retry loop can make thousands of calls a minute without anyone noticing.
Risk signalsBulk/mass operation — affects multiple targets
Attacks that exploit this kind of access
The rule that runs get_device_health safely
PolicyLayer is an MCP gateway: it sits between your AI agents and Busymate DevTools, and checks every tool call against a rule you set before the call runs. Nothing changes on the server itself. For get_device_health, this is the rule to start with:
get_device_health is read-only, so it stays allowed. Everything else on the server is denied unless you say otherwise.
The button opens the PolicyLayer dashboard: create your workspace, connect Busymate DevTools, apply this rule, and every get_device_health call is checked against it from then on.
Questions about get_device_health
THE ONE QUERY (#1157/#1160): the latest capture-health projection for ONE device — one device_health row, no scan, no on-device access needed. Answers "is the TLS-intercept engine armed, and if not, WHY": engine_state ('armed'|'inert') + engine_reason (e.g. no_ca_key) + state_established_at (when that state was first established, so a stale fact is visibly stale), the CA triple (ca_loaded / ca_key_present / ca_trusted — 'trusted CA, missing key' means refetch the cert BUNDLE; 'CA not trusted' means reinstall the profile: opposite fixes today's signals cannot distinguish), ssl_domain_count + ssl_domain_hash (compare against the server's expected effective-settings hash: mismatch = config-delivery fault, match + inert = engine fault), config_hash/config_fetched_at, the decrypt counters (flows_total / flows_decrypted / flows_reasons {reason: count} over no_engine|no_sni|out_of_scope|leaf_mint_failed|ca_untrusted|pinned|upstream_failed), events_dropped + last_seq/seq_gaps (the telemetry stream's own honesty detectors), tunnel_state, app_build + ios_version + boot_id, and last_error. The row is trigger-written from device_events (the DEVICE's own claims about itself — diagnostic, never authorization). iOS-ONLY BY TRIGGER (#1208): device_events is a MULTI-PRODUCER stream (the PAC/proxy server writes to it too), but this projection admits ONLY legacy/no-producer and detail.producer='ios' rows — a proxy/PAC event can never refresh last_event_at/updated_at or overwrite last_error, so this row is never 'recently healthy' on another process's evidence, and every unknown future producer fails closed the same way. For the proxy's own stream use list_device_events with producer:'proxy-server'. A device with NO row returns found:false + a note (it has never emitted telemetry — needs an iOS build with the #1160 emitter); that is a NORMAL complete answer, and absence of telemetry is never evidence of health. Owner-scoped: without devices:view you may still read YOUR OWN device by uuid/name. It is categorised as a Read tool in the Busymate DevTools MCP Server, which means it retrieves data without modifying state.
get_device_health accepts 2 parameters: deviceName, device_uuid. The full parameter table on this page comes from the server's own tool schema.
Register the Busymate DevTools MCP server in PolicyLayer and add a rule for get_device_health: allow, deny, rate-limit, or require approval. Point your MCP client at the PolicyLayer proxy URL and the rule is enforced on every call, before it reaches Busymate DevTools. Nothing to install.
get_device_health is a Read tool with low risk. Read-only tools are generally safe to allow by default.
Yes. Add a rate_limit block to the get_device_health rule in your PolicyLayer policy. For example, setting max: 10 and window: 60 limits the tool to 10 calls per minute. Rate limits are tracked per agent session and reset automatically.
Set action: deny in the PolicyLayer policy for get_device_health. The AI agent will receive a policy violation error and cannot call the tool. You can also include a reason field to explain why the tool is blocked.
get_device_health is provided by the Busymate DevTools MCP server (https://mcp.busymate.dev). PolicyLayer sits as a proxy in front of this server to enforce policies before tool calls reach the server.
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