mcp__planning__delete_todo
删除 Todo。只在用户明确要求删除时使用；含 nativeOrigin 且来源为可写已连接系统提醒事项列表时，会真实删除对应 macOS Reminder，必须先说明该外部副作用并取得用户确认；只读来源会失败。仅 Pi Agent 可用。
This record as markdown: /tools/dutydeck/mcp--planning--delete-todo.md
What mcp__planning__delete_todo does on DutyDeck
AI agents call mcp__planning__delete_todo to permanently remove resources in DutyDeck, typically in cleanup and lifecycle workflows. It does its job in a single call, and there is no undo.
Why mcp__planning__delete_todo is rated Critical
An AI agent that decides to call mcp__planning__delete_todo doesn't hesitate, doesn't double-check, and doesn't stop at one. Whatever it removes from DutyDeck is gone. There is no undo for destructive operations.
Attacks that exploit this kind of access
The rule that runs mcp__planning__delete_todo safely
PolicyLayer is an MCP gateway: it sits between your AI agents and DutyDeck, and checks every tool call against a rule you set before the call runs. Nothing changes on the server itself. For mcp__planning__delete_todo, this is the rule to start with:
mcp__planning__delete_todo is removed from the agent's tool list entirely, so the agent never calls it. The rest of the server keeps working.
The button opens the PolicyLayer dashboard: create your workspace, connect DutyDeck, apply this rule, and every mcp__planning__delete_todo call is checked against it from then on.
Questions about mcp__planning__delete_todo
删除 Todo。只在用户明确要求删除时使用；含 nativeOrigin 且来源为可写已连接系统提醒事项列表时，会真实删除对应 macOS Reminder，必须先说明该外部副作用并取得用户确认；只读来源会失败。仅 Pi Agent 可用。. It is categorised as a Destructive tool in the DutyDeck MCP Server, which means it can permanently delete or destroy data. Block by default and require explicit approval.
Register the DutyDeck MCP server in PolicyLayer and add a rule for mcp__planning__delete_todo: allow, deny, rate-limit, or require approval. Point your MCP client at the PolicyLayer proxy URL and the rule is enforced on every call, before it reaches DutyDeck. Nothing to install.
mcp__planning__delete_todo is a Destructive tool with critical risk. Critical-risk tools should be blocked by default and only enabled with explicit human approval.
Yes. Add a rate_limit block to the mcp__planning__delete_todo rule in your PolicyLayer policy. For example, setting max: 10 and window: 60 limits the tool to 10 calls per minute. Rate limits are tracked per agent session and reset automatically.
Set action: deny in the PolicyLayer policy for mcp__planning__delete_todo. The AI agent will receive a policy violation error and cannot call the tool. You can also include a reason field to explain why the tool is blocked.
mcp__planning__delete_todo is provided by the DutyDeck MCP server (taokoplay/DutyDeck). PolicyLayer sits as a proxy in front of this server to enforce policies before tool calls reach the server.
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