browser_get_text

A read tool on the MCP Framework Personal MCP server.

SERVERMCP Framework Personal SOURCEinggerman/mcps

Low RISK CLASS

Category Read

Parameters 00 required

Recommended Allowedsee the rule below

Registry record Grade F, identity unverified Pull the record →

This record as markdown: /tools/inggerman-mcps/browser-get-text.md

WHAT IT DOES

What browser_get_text does on MCP Framework Personal

AI agents call browser_get_text to retrieve information from MCP Framework Personal without modifying anything. It is typically the context-gathering step in research, monitoring, and reporting workflows, before the agent takes action elsewhere.

RISK

Why browser_get_text is rated Low

The tool appears to retrieve or extract text from browser content without modifying it. With no description provided, confidence is moderate but the name is unambiguous in suggesting a read operation. Browser text retrieval has minimal blast radius unless credentials or sensitive data are exposed, but that is not inherent to the operation itself.

From the tool's definition Tool name 'browser_get_text' indicates retrieval of text content from a browser; the empty description prevents direct confirmation but the naming convention strongly suggests read-only text extraction.

Attacks that exploit this kind of access

RECOMMENDED RULE

The rule that runs browser_get_text safely

PolicyLayer is an MCP gateway: it sits between your AI agents and MCP Framework Personal, and checks every tool call against a rule you set before the call runs. Nothing changes on the server itself. For browser_get_text, this is the rule to start with:

browser_get_text Allowed

browser_get_text is read-only, so it stays allowed. Everything else on the server is denied unless you say otherwise.

View as policy code

policy.json

{
  "version": "1",
  "default": "deny",
  "tools": {
    "browser_get_text": {}
  }
}

ALLOW ONLY THIS TOOL → Instant setup, no code required.

The button opens the PolicyLayer dashboard: create your workspace, connect MCP Framework Personal, apply this rule, and every browser_get_text call is checked against it from then on.

FAQ

Questions about browser_get_text

What does the browser_get_text tool do? +

browser_get_text is a read tool on the MCP Framework Personal MCP server. It is categorised as a Read tool in the MCP Framework Personal MCP Server, which means it retrieves data without modifying state.

How do I enforce a policy on browser_get_text? +

Register the MCP Framework Personal MCP server in PolicyLayer and add a rule for browser_get_text: allow, deny, rate-limit, or require approval. Point your MCP client at the PolicyLayer proxy URL and the rule is enforced on every call, before it reaches MCP Framework Personal. Nothing to install.

What risk level is browser_get_text? +

browser_get_text is a Read tool with low risk. Read-only tools are generally safe to allow by default.

Can I rate-limit browser_get_text? +

Yes. Add a rate_limit block to the browser_get_text rule in your PolicyLayer policy. For example, setting max: 10 and window: 60 limits the tool to 10 calls per minute. Rate limits are tracked per agent session and reset automatically.

How do I block browser_get_text completely? +

Set action: deny in the PolicyLayer policy for browser_get_text. The AI agent will receive a policy violation error and cannot call the tool. You can also include a reason field to explain why the tool is blocked.

What MCP server provides browser_get_text? +

browser_get_text is provided by the MCP Framework Personal MCP server (inggerman/mcps). PolicyLayer sits as a proxy in front of this server to enforce policies before tool calls reach the server.

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