Execute a TED (or TEF when intra-Bradesco) transfer from the merchant
AI agents use transfer_ted to commit financial operations through Mcp Afip — usually the final step of a payment, billing, or trading workflow. A call moves real money.
This tool directly executes financial transfers (TED/TEF), which commits financial obligations and moves money. Financial operations have the highest severity due to irreversible monetary impact. The explicit mention of 'transfer' combined with specific banking transfer protocols (TED/TEF) confirms this is a money-moving operation with critical blast radius if misused by an AI agent.
From the tool's definition Tool name 'transfer_ted' and description explicitly states 'Execute a TED (or TEF when intra-Bradesco) transfer from the merchant' — TED and TEF are Brazilian electronic transfer systems that move money between accounts.
Documented attack patterns abuse exactly the kind of access transfer_ted gives an agent:
PolicyLayer is an MCP gateway — it sits between your AI agents and Mcp Afip, and nothing reaches the server without passing your rules. This is the rule we recommend for transfer_ted:
{
"version": "1",
"default": "deny",
"tools": {
"transfer_ted": {
"deny_if": [
{
"conditions": [],
"on_deny": "Requires human approval."
}
]
}
}
} Any call to transfer_ted is blocked until a human approves it. The rest of the server keeps working.
Free to start. No card required.
Execute a TED (or TEF when intra-Bradesco) transfer from the merchant. It is categorised as a Financial tool in the Mcp Afip MCP Server, which means it involves financial transactions. Block by default and require explicit approval.
Register the Mcp Afip MCP server in PolicyLayer and add a rule for transfer_ted: allow, deny, rate-limit, or require approval. Point your MCP client at the PolicyLayer proxy URL and the rule is enforced on every call, before it reaches Mcp Afip. Nothing to install.
transfer_ted is a Financial tool with critical risk. Critical-risk tools should be blocked by default and only enabled with explicit human approval.
Yes. Add a rate_limit block to the transfer_ted rule in your PolicyLayer policy. For example, setting max: 10 and window: 60 limits the tool to 10 calls per minute. Rate limits are tracked per agent session and reset automatically.
Set action: deny in the PolicyLayer policy for transfer_ted. The AI agent will receive a policy violation error and cannot call the tool. You can also include a reason field to explain why the tool is blocked.
transfer_ted is provided by the Mcp Afip MCP server (codespar/mcp-dev-latam). PolicyLayer sits as a proxy in front of this server to enforce policies before tool calls reach the server.
Start from Mcp Afip, add the rest of your stack, and see everything your agents can call. Then put policy on all of it.
Free to start. No card required.
1300 Mcp Afip tools catalogued and risk-classified — across an index of 43,000+ MCP servers.