export_security_context
Export security context for MCP server analysis. Generates enrichment JSON for skill-scan: tool registrations with annotations, transitive call graphs classified by security category (file_read, file_write, network_outbound, env_read, shell_exec, crypto, serialization), sensitive data flows, and ...
This record as markdown: /tools/nikolai-vysotskyi-trace-mcp/export-security-context.md
What export_security_context does on Trace
AI agents call export_security_context to retrieve information from Trace without modifying anything. It is typically the context-gathering step in research, monitoring, and reporting workflows, before the agent takes action elsewhere.
Why export_security_context is rated Low
The tool is explicitly described as read-only and generates/exports an analysis report (security context, call graphs, sensitive data flows, capability maps). It does not modify, delete, or execute anything.
From the tool's definition Export security context... Read-only. Returns JSON: { tool_registrations, sensitive_flows, capability_map, warnings }
Attacks that exploit this kind of access
The rule that runs export_security_context safely
PolicyLayer is an MCP gateway: it sits between your AI agents and Trace, and checks every tool call against a rule you set before the call runs. Nothing changes on the server itself. For export_security_context, this is the rule to start with:
export_security_context is read-only, so it stays allowed. Everything else on the server is denied unless you say otherwise.
The button opens the PolicyLayer dashboard: create your workspace, connect Trace, apply this rule, and every export_security_context call is checked against it from then on.
Questions about export_security_context
Export security context for MCP server analysis. Generates enrichment JSON for skill-scan: tool registrations with annotations, transitive call graphs classified by security category (file_read, file_write, network_outbound, env_read, shell_exec, crypto, serialization), sensitive data flows, and per-file capability maps. Use to analyze MCP server security before installation. Read-only. Returns JSON: { tool_registrations, sensitive_flows, capability_map, warnings }. It is categorised as a Read tool in the Trace MCP Server, which means it retrieves data without modifying state.
Register the Trace MCP server in PolicyLayer and add a rule for export_security_context: allow, deny, rate-limit, or require approval. Point your MCP client at the PolicyLayer proxy URL and the rule is enforced on every call, before it reaches Trace. Nothing to install.
export_security_context is a Read tool with low risk. Read-only tools are generally safe to allow by default.
Yes. Add a rate_limit block to the export_security_context rule in your PolicyLayer policy. For example, setting max: 10 and window: 60 limits the tool to 10 calls per minute. Rate limits are tracked per agent session and reset automatically.
Set action: deny in the PolicyLayer policy for export_security_context. The AI agent will receive a policy violation error and cannot call the tool. You can also include a reason field to explain why the tool is blocked.
export_security_context is provided by the Trace MCP server (nikolai-vysotskyi/trace-mcp). PolicyLayer sits as a proxy in front of this server to enforce policies before tool calls reach the server.
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