Load an executable file into GDB/pwndbg for debugging. Args: binary_path: Absolute path to the ELF to debug. Use the container-visible path under /workspace; relative paths resolve under /workspace. If your host file is ./workspace/chal, pass /workspace/chal here. Returns: Dict with MI command re...
AI agents invoke set_file to trigger actions in Pwno. What it does depends on the arguments the agent supplies, and its effects often reach beyond the immediate call — builds kicked off, notifications sent, workflows started.
This tool loads a binary into a debugger (GDB/pwndbg), which is a precursor to executing and analyzing potentially malicious code. While the act of loading itself may not immediately execute code, it sets up a live debugging session with an executable ELF binary, which can trigger constructors, shared library initialization, and enables subsequent execution.
From the tool's definition Load an executable file into GDB/pwndbg for debugging
Documented attack patterns abuse exactly the kind of access set_file gives an agent:
PolicyLayer is an MCP gateway — it sits between your AI agents and Pwno, and nothing reaches the server without passing your rules. This is the rule we recommend for set_file:
{
"version": "1",
"default": "deny",
"tools": {
"set_file": {
"limits": [
{
"counter": "set_file_rate",
"window": "minute",
"max": 10,
"scope": "grant"
}
]
}
}
}set_file stays usable, but rate-capped — a runaway agent can't fire it dozens of times a minute. Everything else on the server is denied unless you say otherwise.
Free to start. No card required.
Load an executable file into GDB/pwndbg for debugging. Args: binary_path: Absolute path to the ELF to debug. Use the container-visible path under /workspace; relative paths resolve under /workspace. If your host file is ./workspace/chal, pass /workspace/chal here. Returns: Dict with MI command responses and state. It is categorised as a Execute tool in the Pwno MCP Server, which means it can trigger actions or run processes. Use rate limits and argument validation.
Register the Pwno MCP server in PolicyLayer and add a rule for set_file: allow, deny, rate-limit, or require approval. Point your MCP client at the PolicyLayer proxy URL and the rule is enforced on every call, before it reaches Pwno. Nothing to install.
set_file is a Execute tool with high risk. Execute tools should be rate-limited and have argument validation enabled.
Yes. Add a rate_limit block to the set_file rule in your PolicyLayer policy. For example, setting max: 10 and window: 60 limits the tool to 10 calls per minute. Rate limits are tracked per agent session and reset automatically.
Set action: deny in the PolicyLayer policy for set_file. The AI agent will receive a policy violation error and cannot call the tool. You can also include a reason field to explain why the tool is blocked.
set_file is provided by the Pwno MCP server (pwno-io/pwno-mcp). PolicyLayer sits as a proxy in front of this server to enforce policies before tool calls reach the server.
Deterministic rules across all 36 Pwno tools. Per-identity grants. Full audit log. Live in minutes. Nothing to install.
Free to start. No card required.
36 Pwno tools catalogued and risk-classified — across an index of 42,500+ MCP servers.