Remove an SDT content control wrapper, keeping its content in place.
AI agents call delete_content_control to permanently remove resources in Docx — typically in cleanup and lifecycle workflows. It does its job in a single call, and there is no undo.
This tool performs irreversible deletion of document structural elements (content controls/SDTs). Although content is retained, the removal of the wrapper cannot be undone through normal document operations and alters the document's structure permanently. This qualifies as Destructive rather than Write due to the irreversible nature of structural manipulation.
From the tool's definition Tool name 'delete_content_control' and description 'Remove an SDT content control wrapper' indicate irreversible deletion of document structure elements.
Documented attack patterns abuse exactly the kind of access delete_content_control gives an agent:
PolicyLayer is an MCP gateway — it sits between your AI agents and Docx, and nothing reaches the server without passing your rules. This is the rule we recommend for delete_content_control:
{
"version": "1",
"default": "deny",
"hide": [
"delete_content_control"
]
} delete_content_control disappears from the agent's tool list entirely, and any attempt to call it is denied. The rest of the server keeps working.
Free to start. No card required.
Remove an SDT content control wrapper, keeping its content in place. It is categorised as a Destructive tool in the Docx MCP Server, which means it can permanently delete or destroy data. Block by default and require explicit approval.
Register the Docx MCP server in PolicyLayer and add a rule for delete_content_control: allow, deny, rate-limit, or require approval. Point your MCP client at the PolicyLayer proxy URL and the rule is enforced on every call, before it reaches Docx. Nothing to install.
delete_content_control is a Destructive tool with critical risk. Critical-risk tools should be blocked by default and only enabled with explicit human approval.
Yes. Add a rate_limit block to the delete_content_control rule in your PolicyLayer policy. For example, setting max: 10 and window: 60 limits the tool to 10 calls per minute. Rate limits are tracked per agent session and reset automatically.
Set action: deny in the PolicyLayer policy for delete_content_control. The AI agent will receive a policy violation error and cannot call the tool. You can also include a reason field to explain why the tool is blocked.
delete_content_control is provided by the Docx MCP server (securityronin/docx-mcp). PolicyLayer sits as a proxy in front of this server to enforce policies before tool calls reach the server.
Start from Docx, add the rest of your stack, and see everything your agents can call. Then put policy on all of it.
Free to start. No card required.
219 Docx tools catalogued and risk-classified — across an index of 43,000+ MCP servers.