Execute a TED (or TEF when intra-Bradesco) transfer from the merchant
AI agents use transfer_ted to commit financial operations through Mcp Ap2 — usually the final step of a payment, billing, or trading workflow. A call moves real money.
This tool moves money between accounts on behalf of a merchant. It commits a financial obligation and transfers funds, which is irreversible once executed. The critical severity reflects the high blast radius: an AI agent with misuse of this tool could drain merchant accounts or transfer funds to unauthorized recipients.
From the tool's definition Tool name 'transfer_ted' and description 'Execute a TED (or TEF when intra-Bradesco) transfer from the merchant' explicitly performs financial transfers. TED (Transferência Eletrônica de Débito) is a Brazilian electronic funds transfer mechanism.
Documented attack patterns abuse exactly the kind of access transfer_ted gives an agent:
PolicyLayer is an MCP gateway — it sits between your AI agents and Mcp Ap2, and nothing reaches the server without passing your rules. This is the rule we recommend for transfer_ted:
{
"version": "1",
"default": "deny",
"tools": {
"transfer_ted": {
"deny_if": [
{
"conditions": [],
"on_deny": "Requires human approval."
}
]
}
}
} Any call to transfer_ted is blocked until a human approves it. The rest of the server keeps working.
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Execute a TED (or TEF when intra-Bradesco) transfer from the merchant. It is categorised as a Financial tool in the Mcp Ap2 MCP Server, which means it involves financial transactions. Block by default and require explicit approval.
Register the Mcp Ap2 MCP server in PolicyLayer and add a rule for transfer_ted: allow, deny, rate-limit, or require approval. Point your MCP client at the PolicyLayer proxy URL and the rule is enforced on every call, before it reaches Mcp Ap2. Nothing to install.
transfer_ted is a Financial tool with critical risk. Critical-risk tools should be blocked by default and only enabled with explicit human approval.
Yes. Add a rate_limit block to the transfer_ted rule in your PolicyLayer policy. For example, setting max: 10 and window: 60 limits the tool to 10 calls per minute. Rate limits are tracked per agent session and reset automatically.
Set action: deny in the PolicyLayer policy for transfer_ted. The AI agent will receive a policy violation error and cannot call the tool. You can also include a reason field to explain why the tool is blocked.
transfer_ted is provided by the Mcp Ap2 MCP server (@codespar/mcp-ap2). PolicyLayer sits as a proxy in front of this server to enforce policies before tool calls reach the server.
Start from Mcp Ap2, add the rest of your stack, and see everything your agents can call. Then put policy on all of it.
Free to start. No card required.
1300 Mcp Ap2 tools catalogued and risk-classified — across an index of 43,000+ MCP servers.