extract.table

THE RISK

Low Risk

Why extract.table needs a policy

This tool reads and retrieves table data from a web page, converting it to JSON format. It performs no write, execute, or destructive operations — it only extracts/queries existing content from the browser DOM.

From the tool's definition Extract table data as JSON

Documented attack patterns abuse exactly the kind of access extract.table gives an agent:

POLICY

How to control extract.table

PolicyLayer is an MCP gateway — it sits between your AI agents and LCBro, and nothing reaches the server without passing your rules. This is the rule we recommend for extract.table:

policy.json

{
  "version": "1",
  "default": "deny",
  "tools": {
    "extract.table": {}
  }
}

extract.table is read-only, so it stays allowed — but everything else on the server is denied unless you say otherwise.

Create a free account and register LCBro — nothing to install.
Add this policy — paste it, or build it visually.
Point your MCP client (Claude, Cursor, anything) at your gateway URL.

CAP THIS TOOL →

Free to start. No card required.

EXPLORE

Related tools and policies

More LCBro tools

Execute interact.click Click on an element using CSS selector, text, or role Execute interact.wait Wait for a condition (selector, network idle, or URL change) Execute llm.transform Transform data using LLM with custom instructions and JSON schema validation Execute navigate.goto Navigate to a URL in an existing page context Execute navigate.open Open a URL and create a new page context Execute session.auth Perform authentication by executing a sequence of actions Write interact.type Type text into an input field Read extract.attributes Extract attributes from elements matching CSS selectors

All 11 LCBro tools →

Read tools on other servers

M-Team MCP Server get_torrent_detail YouTube MCP Server search_channel Android Forensics ADB MCP Server parse_browser_history 0xarchive web3_challenge

Go deeper

The MCP Attack Database → Documented attack patterns against MCP deployments — and the policies that stop them.
Data exfiltration → How read access becomes an exfiltration channel when chained with untrusted content.
MCP token cost → What connecting this server costs in context-window tokens on every request.
Rate Limiting MCP Tool Calls: A Practical Guide →
MCP Security: Why Prompt Guardrails Aren't Enough →

FAQ

Questions about extract.table

What does the extract.table tool do? +

Extract table data as JSON. It is categorised as a Read tool in the LCBro MCP Server, which means it retrieves data without modifying state.

How do I enforce a policy on extract.table? +

Register the LCBro MCP server in PolicyLayer and add a rule for extract.table: allow, deny, rate-limit, or require approval. Point your MCP client at the PolicyLayer proxy URL and the rule is enforced on every call, before it reaches LCBro. Nothing to install.

What risk level is extract.table? +

extract.table is a Read tool with low risk. Read-only tools are generally safe to allow by default.

Can I rate-limit extract.table? +

Yes. Add a rate_limit block to the extract.table rule in your PolicyLayer policy. For example, setting max: 10 and window: 60 limits the tool to 10 calls per minute. Rate limits are tracked per agent session and reset automatically.

How do I block extract.table completely? +

Set action: deny in the PolicyLayer policy for extract.table. The AI agent will receive a policy violation error and cannot call the tool. You can also include a reason field to explain why the tool is blocked.

What MCP server provides extract.table? +

extract.table is provided by the LCBro MCP server (lcbro/lcbro-mcp). PolicyLayer sits as a proxy in front of this server to enforce policies before tool calls reach the server.

Enforce policy on every LCBro tool call.

Start from LCBro, add the rest of your stack, and see everything your agents can call. Then put policy on all of it.

CHECK YOUR STACK →