find_by_browse_name

THE RISK

Low Risk

Why find_by_browse_name needs a policy

This tool retrieves or queries nodes from the OPC UA server tree based on browse name patterns. It performs a read-only search operation with no side effects—it neither modifies data, executes commands, deletes content, nor involves financial transactions. The wildcard support is a standard filtering feature of search tools.

From the tool's definition Tool name 'find_by_browse_name' and description 'Find nodes by browse name pattern (supports wildcards)' indicate a search/query operation with no modification of data.

Documented attack patterns abuse exactly the kind of access find_by_browse_name gives an agent:

POLICY

How to control find_by_browse_name

PolicyLayer is an MCP gateway — it sits between your AI agents and OPC UA MCP Server, and nothing reaches the server without passing your rules. This is the rule we recommend for find_by_browse_name:

policy.json

{
  "version": "1",
  "default": "deny",
  "tools": {
    "find_by_browse_name": {}
  }
}

find_by_browse_name is read-only, so it stays allowed — but everything else on the server is denied unless you say otherwise.

Create a free account and register OPC UA MCP Server — nothing to install.
Add this policy — paste it, or build it visually.
Point your MCP client (Claude, Cursor, anything) at your gateway URL.

CAP THIS TOOL →

Free to start. No card required.

EXPLORE

Related tools and policies

More OPC UA MCP Server tools

Read find_by_display_name Find nodes by display name pattern (supports wildcards) Read read_value Read the current value of one or more OPC UA nodes

All 3 OPC UA MCP Server tools →

Read tools on other servers

M-Team MCP Server get_torrent_detail YouTube MCP Server search_channel Android Forensics ADB MCP Server parse_browser_history 0xarchive web3_challenge

Go deeper

The MCP Attack Database → Documented attack patterns against MCP deployments — and the policies that stop them.
Data exfiltration → How read access becomes an exfiltration channel when chained with untrusted content.
MCP token cost → What connecting this server costs in context-window tokens on every request.
Rate Limiting MCP Tool Calls: A Practical Guide →
MCP Security: Why Prompt Guardrails Aren't Enough →

FAQ

Questions about find_by_browse_name

What does the find_by_browse_name tool do? +

Find nodes by browse name pattern (supports wildcards). It is categorised as a Read tool in the OPC UA MCP Server MCP Server, which means it retrieves data without modifying state.

How do I enforce a policy on find_by_browse_name? +

Register the OPC UA MCP Server MCP server in PolicyLayer and add a rule for find_by_browse_name: allow, deny, rate-limit, or require approval. Point your MCP client at the PolicyLayer proxy URL and the rule is enforced on every call, before it reaches OPC UA MCP Server. Nothing to install.

What risk level is find_by_browse_name? +

find_by_browse_name is a Read tool with low risk. Read-only tools are generally safe to allow by default.

Can I rate-limit find_by_browse_name? +

Yes. Add a rate_limit block to the find_by_browse_name rule in your PolicyLayer policy. For example, setting max: 10 and window: 60 limits the tool to 10 calls per minute. Rate limits are tracked per agent session and reset automatically.

How do I block find_by_browse_name completely? +

Set action: deny in the PolicyLayer policy for find_by_browse_name. The AI agent will receive a policy violation error and cannot call the tool. You can also include a reason field to explain why the tool is blocked.

What MCP server provides find_by_browse_name? +

find_by_browse_name is provided by the OPC UA MCP Server MCP server (vogler75/opcua-mcp-server). PolicyLayer sits as a proxy in front of this server to enforce policies before tool calls reach the server.

Enforce policy on every OPC UA MCP Server tool call.

Start from OPC UA MCP Server, add the rest of your stack, and see everything your agents can call. Then put policy on all of it.

CHECK YOUR STACK →